wombat wrote:
First, I don't think that a deep and fully satisfying theory of human motivation is easy to come by. Had I thought that, I'd have that theory and I'd have shared it with you. What I do think is that we don't need such a theory to make progress in undermining egoism.
1. Agreed. 2. I'm sure of that. 3. Agreed, but... if we wish to make progress in proposing an alternative then I think that we
do need to address the problem of basic theory. I guess I'm coming from a somewhat different direction, in that my basic concern is not directly with human motivation, although that does enter into it for me.
wombat wrote:
Second, I think we have diametrically opposed approaches to methodolgy in philosophy. My interest in philosophy is primarily an interest in solving problems. I prefer to start with as few theoretical commitments as possible and to add commitments only when a problem forces me to do so. I suppose my approach is in certain respects Cartesian although I would never have said that had your post not drawn it out. In general, I distrust ideology and endorse only what I can't do without. This is very terse but, for me, ideology is always at the end of the road, never at the beginning. For me all the fun is in the travelling. If I reach the end of some particular road fine; I don't hate ideology. But if I never reach the end of the road, I'm happy to learn what I can along the way.
1. Yes, we are coming from different directions. I would characterize my interest not so much as problem solving--as in crosswords--as seeking understanding.
2. I would differ with your characterization of Descartes, I think. I see Descartes as arrogantly applying the methodology of mathematics--the field in which he had experienced significant success--to problems that are non-mathematical in nature. (Cf. Gilson's
The Unity of Philosophical Experience) The arrogance comes in with his dismissal of previous thought and his assumption that he could provide answers without serious study beyond what he had done to that point. The result: he based his philosophy on a
non sequitur. He should have said:
Sum, ergo cogito. If he had, he might have provided a real service to humanity, because he would have returned the focus of philosophy to where it should begin: the act of existing. I don't see seeking a secure starting point as piling up extraneous theoretical commitments, but as a humble and prudent procedure designed precisely to eliminate ideological considerations (but cf. #3). To do otherwise seems rash to me--kind of like my usual procedure of jumping into threads on the chiffboard midstream without bothering to read the earlier posts.
3. I use "ideology" to mean pretty much the opposite of "philosophy." If philosophy is the love of wisdom, ideology (as I use the term) is the pursuit of power through the manipulation of concepts. Contrast Plato, Aristotle and Aquinas with Hegel and Marx. (Cf. Voegelin's article "Hegel as Sorcerer" and his small book
Science, Politics and Gnosticism. Maritain has a chapter on this topic in
Peasant of the Garonne--he uses the term ideosopher to characterize most modern thinkers. Also, Hans Jonas has an excellent article on Heidegger in the same regard in
The Phenomenon of Life.)
4. My big problem with much of the current work in philosophy is that it seems to assume that it can proceed by basically clarifying the meaning of words and applying logic, without paying much attention to history and other social sciences. I guess that's part of our Enlightenment heritage. The result, in my opinion, has been one philosophical trainwreck after another, leading in a very direct way to the orgy of violence in the 20th century. That's over simplified, of course, and the stock response is to point, with Hobbes
et alios, to the record of the European wars of religion. My answer to that is to argue that those wars too resulted from the triumph of ideology over philosophy.
I certainly appreciate your good intentions, but I do question your approach. I realize (through long experience) that my approach is suspect (or just plain tiresome) to many people, but I also realize (through equally long experience) the truth of what Voegelin said: "The attack on metaphysics can be undertaken with good conscience only from the safe distance of imperfect knowledge." Sadly the problem may really be with imperfect knowledge rather than bad intentions: a lot of people sincerely think it would be a waste of time to even inquire into these issues.
Preemptive note to Stoner: despite my references to Voegelin and Jonas, I have
not become a phenomenologist.
For me, phenomenology is part of the problem, or certainly symptomatic of the problem, rather than part of the solution except to the extent that some from that school have provided incisive critiques of the modern malaise. I don't see their solutions as particularly helpful, although some prominent Churchmen (who should know better
) are infatuated with phenomenology.
Note to Lorenzo: I used to have an inclination to idealize the instinctive goodness of "simple" people, too, but time after time I've been let down by such people or have seen them take a powder when it comes to moral decisions more complicated than putting chains on tires for strangers.