OT: Egoism vs. Altruism

[Jerry Freeman]

I'm convinced that the idea of self negation is overworked and has been at least an obstacle and even a source of considerable harm, to many who try to slay the ego in pursuit of a spiritual goal.

By removing all their worldly desires, couldn't the buddhist be in a position to always act altruisticly? Their goal is to have no selfish desires, if they succeed than any action they take would be altruistic?
I don't like this kind of escapism, so I don't mean to advocate Buddhism, but the buddhist may give an example of that elusive, wholly altruistic act.

I agree with you that this is logical, and I believe some have accomplished it. However, I believe it works better in the positive.

By expanding awareness to include all humanity (or the whole of existence) within the realm of self, the small ego's selfish desires are transcended. I believe this is more realistic and practical because it involves a positive influence coming to bear, rather than simply trying to effect the destruction of something believed to be negative with nothing provided in its place.

This is parallel to much of the religious world's struggle with sinfulness. There can be a preoccupation with sin that imprisons the spiritual aspirant in a kind of living hell, even while wanting to be released from sin. However, the force of a transcendental spiritual awakening may transform that person's relationship to sin and bring a release that was impossible to accomplish by wrestling directly with sin.

Best wishes,
Jerry

[glauber]

This is parallel to much of the religious world's struggle with sinfulness. There can be a preoccupation with sin that imprisons the spiritual aspirant in a kind of living hell, even while wanting to be released from sin. However, the force of a transcendental spiritual awakening may transform that person's relationship to sin and bring a release that was impossible to accomplish by wrestling directly with sin.

You're in line with "Protestant" theology there, Jerry. Martin Luther and Karl Barth wrestled with this (and, they would say, so did St. Paul).

But what am i doing read this thread!?!?!?

[jim stone]

Nah, elendil, I don't think we disagree
about anything. I don't have a materialistic
account of the good; I think that human
flourishing matters and that we may have
a duty to do what helps us to flourish.
You don't know, my friend, how many
flutes and whistles I have....Jim

[Wombat]

Wombat writes:

'We still get a unified theory if we drop the words 'for ourselves' from this account of motivation. We seek the good. That's a unified theory. With that modification, the second point only looks plausible to someone who already embraces egoism.
What's mysterious about my pursuing a non-self-interested good if it is the greater good? Only someone who has already
swallowed egoism as an ideology would find that puzzling and yet this is supposed to be an argument for that ideology.'

I don't consider myself in thrall to psychological egoism, which
I see as doubtful. Earlier in this thread I gave what I
alleged was a refutation of Hobbes' view.

I was only commenting on your argument for the attractiveness of a Hobbesian account of motivation. I should have made it clearer that I wasn't criticisng any view you actually endorse.

Still I do find 'deeply' altruistic motivation, genuine selflessness,
less easy to understand than self-interested motivation.
That something is what I want for myself, that I recognize
it as good for me, explains straightforwardly why I act
to produce it. That something is wanted by somebody else
on the other side of the planet, that it is good for her--
it's far less clear why that would motivate me to
act so as to get it for her.
I think it's less easy to understand
how selfless action happens than it is (for me, anyway) to
understand self-interested motivation--though I believe
the former happens. Hobbes's theory, in assimilating
all motivation to the self-interested, makes motivation
easier to understand--which is one of the
reasons for its durability.

But this is precisely what I was disputing. Selfish motivation is only easier to understand for the egoist. I'm sure you're not in thrall to egoism, but when you play devils advocate, you talk as though you were. I think this is the sort of remark that makes Elendil accuse you of being too materialistic.

I'm sorry this thread has moved in the direction it has, not because I find religious or spiritualist accounts of motivation uninteresting, but because I think we ought to have a naturalistic answer to Hobbes and to the neo-Hobbesians who mistakenly draw normative conclusions from psychological egoism. We are governed by people who think that even superfically altruistic acts are a bit crazy. Are they going to listen to arguments that appeal to God or to notions of karma? Would Hobbes have listened? For my part, I want an answer that makes them sit up and listen.

Elendil, I get the impression that you think that only a religious answer will suffice here. I don't see why that should be so and I'm frankly frightened for the future of humankind if it is so, since I'm pretty certain that the people who most need to listen are so ideologically remote from the vocabulary you use to discuss this problem that you have no chance of explaining to them why they should be respectful of altruism. Is your concern with materialism a version of the old concern that 'since God is dead, everything is permitted?' I've never found that inference even remotely plausible.

I think we should all want an answer to the question why altruism is rational that will be as appealing to the atheist as it is to the committed Christian, Jew or Buddhist. An answer that serves this function is bound to be naturalistic, but not necessarily materialistic and certainly not mechanistic. It would have to square with modern evolutionary biology, but, as I pointed out earlier, functionalist philosophies of mind aren't limited to Hobbesian resources when explaining motivation.

Let me have one more go at explaining why I don't think this puzzle requires the metaphysical and theological equivalent of rocket science for a solution. It would be bizarre if it did. Starting with questions like 'why is there something rather than nothing?' to answer a question a child could ask—Mommy why shouldn't I just be selfish?—strikes me as pretty much equivalent to telling the same child that in order to understand how arithmetic bears on getting the correct change at the grocery store she needs first to make a thorough study of the theory of transfinite numbers.

In ordinary deliberation, we simply ask what good would this or that action serve. If a reason that seems compelling comes up that involves benefitting others more than ourselves, we don't pause to wonder how we could possibly be so foolish as to give it weight. My mother really wanted one .. or my friends really like to do it that way is usually explanation enough of why we acted as we did. To see these superficial explanations as even slightly problematic or puzzling is already to be attracted to psychological egoism. Since we don't find them puzzling in everyday life, why should we find them theoretically perplexing unless some general theory of motivation told us that we *ought* to be puzzled by them? That theory is egoism.

Of course, a naturalistic philosophy has to square superficial altruism with evolutionary theory, but, as I explained earlier, a functionalist account of motivation would not be very likely to lead us to egoism and therefore to scepticism about deep altruism. But even if it did make us sceptical about deep altruism, no conclusion would follow about the irrationality of superfically altruistic acts. Since this is how altruism figures in everyday deliberation, this is ultimately what matters most.

[Edited to correct a mistake but not, I think, one which bears on Walden's comment which follows.]

[Walden]

A search for a commonality, in which to express an understanding in a way comprehensible not only to Jews and Christians, but to secularists and Budhists, Muslims and Zoroastrians, Unitarians and senators, academic deans and shamans, is a daunting task, but a worthy pursuit.

It is not possible to achieve or express a philosophy which is compatible with all belief-systems, but, hopefully, language can be used which is accessible to a broad segment. This may entail using different approaches when addressing one audience, from the approach used with another, because the secularist has a different language of expression and symbolism from the Buddhist, and the Christian has a different world-view from either, but, hopefully, all are rational, and capable of engaging in dialogue, from their own perspective, and of exchanging ideas in an effective and lively manner.

Americans tend to speak in terms of personal testimonial. This is seen in 19th Century revivalism, with the testimony services. Perhaps it goes back to the Gospels, with their emphasis on witnesses and testimony, and maybe even to Classical Greek and Latin thought, but the testimonial has pervaded our whole society. Politicians, in their speeches, talk of this person's experience, or that one's. There is an underlying idea that "this is my experience, it can have application to others, as well." This testimonialism is not seen as self-centeredness, as much as a bringing to the collective group, some positive information.

I can see very real negative and positive aspects in this testimonial nature of mainstream American society, but this testimonialism is not the means of communication in all societies. It is cultural peculiarities, such as this, that make diverse methods of communication a necessity.

To say that expressing in terms of the secularist viewpoint is necessary, because only secularists are in power, is too dismissive, and limiting, I believe. While I would tend to agree that one wants to base one's arguments upon the language of the hearer, I do not believe that ruling out the language of spirituality, on the basis that only secularists are the ruling class, is prudent, or indeed based on an accurate assumption.

[Wombat]

To say that expressing in terms of the secularist viewpoint is necessary, because only secularists are in power, is too dismissive, and limiting, I believe. While I would tend to agree that one wants to base one's arguments upon the language of the hearer, I do not believe that ruling out the language of spirituality, on the basis that only secularists are the ruling class, is prudent, or indeed based on an accurate assumption.

Fair call. I think we are actually pretty much in agreement. At the point where I started quoting we seem to part company, but I'm not sure that we do.

First, I think we can see off Hobbes as a threat by simply reflecting on the language of everyday deliberation and pointing out, as I did, that only someone already attracted to egoism finds the non-selfish reasons we characteristically give for acting puzzling. This ought to be enough for community-centred agents, regardless of whether they seek spiritual or non-spiritual ultimate explanations. The everyday language of deliberation is neutral where I come from, and I think it is in the United States as well. To say I missed going to the football match to celebrate my grandmother's birthday is comprehensible to the religious and the wholly secular alike.

Second, since the egoist probably is a secular atheist, it is important to be able to expose the flaws in his or her position in language he or she understands. This is especially important when addressing the next generation of managers and rulers which is an important part of my job. Actually, I think the powerful in western nations are a bit more schizoid than this comments suggest. Most seem adept at talking the language of spirituality for an hour or two on Sunday, and, whenever it suits, slipping into it mid-week, whilst talking the language of egoist individualism the rest of the time. I suspect they are secularists at heart or just unresolved, but how would one know?

That was the core of my point and I probably muddied it at the end by inisisting that ultimate explanations should be compatible with evolutionary biology. That actually overstates my position, so it is fair to call me on it, although I did say that it was a requirement on a naturalistic explanation. Obviously the secularist will require an explanation that meets this requirement but that doesn't rule out the ultimate explanation having a spiritual dimension as well. But the general demand should just be that an ultimate explanation be compatible with the predictive and technological success of modern science, in general, and biology, in particular, since what we are discussing here is the psychology of human motivation. For my part, I want ultimate explanations also to be compatible with the 'success' of spirituality, but I'm not sure how exactly to frame this requirement in a way that is fair to the secularist. However it's to be framed, though, I'm quite sure that Hobbesian egoism will fail dismally.

Thanks Walden, I'm a lot clearer about what I was really trying to say now.

[jim stone]

'Selfish motivation is only easier to understand for the egoist. '

To make it clear where I stand, I disagree with this and
I'm not an egoist (I do believe there are deeply altruistic
actions). That something is good for somebody
on the other side of the planet, that it gets her something
she wants, someone in whom I have
no personal investment and who I'll never meet--
it isn't clear to me how this fact motivates me to act.
It is much more clear to me how the fact
that something is what I want for myself
moves me to seek it.
I find selfless motivation in need
of explanation in a way that selfish motivation is
not. Nonetheless I believe that there are selfless
acts. But I don't believe the theory that we
simply seek the good, irregardless of who gets
it, explains it--because I disbelieve that theory for
the reasons I gave above.

So I think that puzzlement about selfless
action extends well beyond egoists.
If one does feel puzzled by selfless motivation there
are two strategies. The first is to deny that it's
real--action is always ultimately self-interested.
Hobbes did that, and I believe it's one reason
why his theory is so durable, why it doesn't
go away. The second is to explain it. I believe Thomas
Nagel's book 'The Possibility of Altruism'
tries to do that.

One abandons egoism when one
allows that there are deeply altruistic acts, but
I do think the task remains of explaining
such motivation. Psychological egoism is a theory
of human motivation--all acts flow from one source,
self interest. I think we have a pretty good
grasp of what self-interest is, how it arises,
and how it operates in motivating action.
To insist that some acts do not
flow from self interest but from another source entirely
leaves us with the job of explaining what that source is,
how it arises, and how it operates in motivating
action--that is, if we, like Hobbes, are interested
in giving an adequate theory of human action.
Emphatically to say the job needs doing isn't saying
that it can't be done. Best

[elendil]

Wombat wrote...and wrote :

I'm sorry this thread has moved in the direction it has, not because I find religious or spiritualist accounts of motivation uninteresting, but because I think we ought to have a naturalistic answer to Hobbes and to the neo-Hobbesians who mistakenly draw normative conclusions from psychological egoism. We are governed by people who think that even superfically altruistic acts are a bit crazy. Are they going to listen to arguments that appeal to God or to notions of karma? Would Hobbes have listened? For my part, I want an answer that makes them sit up and listen.

You're correct (see below), I don't believe there is a naturalistic answer to Hobbes--or to any of the other philosophers of power throughout history. I highly recommend Eric Voegelin's chapter on Plato's "Gorgias" in Plato and Aristotle for an account of the difficulty faced by a philosopher who tries to communicate with an ideologer. Voegelin's account is as eloquent as they come, and speaks volumes about the modern situation. His The New Science of Politics is even more explicit. Point? 'twas ever thus. You cannot have a dialogue with someone who refuses to listen. You rebuke me for failing to use language that "makes them sit up and listen." But why do I have that obligation and "they," apparently, do not? I don't intend to be flippant. I do constantly look for new ways to make my point, to lead others to understand what I'm trying to get across. But there are limits. Sometimes there is simply no alternative expression available, that is, no alternative that would not sell out or falsify the truth I'm seeking to communicate. Actually, many people do still listen to God language, and if that's the true answer then I don't have much alternative. Not many people listened when Jesus was nailed to the cross, and for centuries Christianity was a marginal movement of little apparent significance, but over centuries more and more people did listen. I'll keep plugging away.

Elendil, I get the impression that you think that only a religious answer will suffice here. I don't see why that should be so and I'm frankly frightened for the future of humankind if it is so, since I'm pretty certain that the people who most need to listen are so ideologically remote from the vocabulary you use to discuss this problem that you have no chance of explaining to them why they should be respectful of altruism. Is your concern with materialism a version of the old concern that 'since God is dead, everything is permitted?' I've never found that inference even remotely plausible.

Yes, you're quite correct...well, as far as I understand it. However, I'm not suggesting that only "a" ( = any) religious answer will suffice. For starters, I'm not sure what you mean by "religion." Many people have the mistaken idea that "religion" excludes reason; I'm not one of those people--in fact, my faith classifies that view as heresy. What I'm suggesting, ultimately, is that only a very specific religious answer will suffice. I'm Roman Catholic, educated (more or less) in Thomist philosophy, but I'm more than happy to meet anyone half way, as long as we're on the same road. If someone beckons from another road, I'll seek to understand where that road is heading, but if it's going the wrong way I'm gonna have to just do my best to convince that person to come my way. That, to me, is true charity.

Let me have one more go at explaining why I don't think this puzzle requires the metaphysical and theological equivalent of rocket science for a solution. It would be bizarre if it did. Starting with questions like 'why is there something rather than nothing?' to answer a question a child could ask—Mommy why shouldn't I just be selfish?—strikes me as pretty much equivalent to telling the same child that in order to understand how arithmetic bears on getting the correct change at the grocery store she needs first to make a thorough study of the theory of transfinite numbers.

Bad example, for me--I haven't a clue about transfinite numbers. However, I think your analogy falls down. I suppose there are problems in math that require deeper explanations than memorization of multiplication tables, which is about as deep as I go in math. The correct response to your son's query--Daddy, why shouldn't I just fly an airplane into a skyscraper full of people?--might seem like a no-brainer to you, but there are a not insignificant number of fathers out there who would respond: But you should, my son! At that point--or at the point where we're trying to find an alternative to a Hobbesian view of society--I think we have to go all the way back to metaphysics to make sure we're on the right path, because I believe that moral philosophy is ultimately grounded on metaphysics, as I understand metaphysics. If we start out on the wrong track to begin with, we'll never get where we want to go. It's a bit like this: Newtonian physics still suffices for most everyday problems, but you'll never really understand unless you get into quantum mechanics or some such theory--and if you don't keep up with those theories you might even find yourself way off base in some matter that you thought was a no-brainer at first glance. Ideas matter. Small mistakes in the short run can lead to big mistakes in the longer run. I happen to think that Christianity, for all the distortions caused by so-called Christians, has enormous explanatory power that is grounded in fundamental philosophical truth--the insight that limited being cannot explain its own existence.

In ordinary deliberation, we simply ask what good would this or that action serve. If a reason that seems compelling comes up that involves benefitting others more than ourselves, we don't pause to wonder how we could possibly be so foolish as to give it weight. My mother really wanted one .. or my friends really like to do it that way is usually explanation enough of why we acted as we did. To see these superficial explanations as even slightly problematic or puzzling is already to be attracted to psychological egoism. Since we don't find them puzzling in everyday life, why should we find them theoretically perplexing unless some general theory of motivation told us that we *ought* to be puzzled by them? That theory is egoism.

Same response as above. But the fact that you've entered this discussion is healthy:

In order to degrade the politics of Plato, Aristotle, or St. Thomas to the rank of "values" among others, a conscientious scholar would first have to show that their claim to be science was unfounded. And that attempt is self-defeating. By the time the would-be critic has penetrated the meaning of metaphysics with sufficient thoroughness to make his criticism weighty, he will have become a metaphysician himself. The attack on metaphysics can be undertaken with good conscience only from the safe distance of imperfect knowledge. --Eric Voegelin, The New Science of Politics

I'm not trying to be a smart aleck here, by quoting Voegelin. I really think that if you study the philosophia perennis you might be amazed at how much light is shed on matters that you thought were trivial and not worthy of further attention. You also might find that certain big, complicated questions are far more susceptible of understanding than you had previously thought.

Cheers

[Wombat]

Jim, my claim wasn't that no altruistic acts are puzzling and in need of special explanation but only that some aren't. To be sure, a common sense understanding of deliberation would expect me to give some extra weight to a goal simply because it is my goal just as it would expect me to give some extra weight to a goal simply because it is the goal of a friend or a loved one. Common sense principles of deliberation don't say how much extra weight these considerations should carry; to that extent common sense rational decision making is an art, not a science. A utilitarian who really would sacrifice self or family for a tiny gain to someone he'd never met would indeed puzzle us.

My claim simply was that smallish personal sacrifices to further the interests of those around us are not puzzling unless one has a theoretical reason to find them puzzling. So citing cases of sacrifices for people I've never met is beside the point. We each of us inhabit, first and foremost, a local moral world. I don't find altruism towards those who share that world very puzzling at all.

That said, every philosopher will want a deep account of human motivation that feels satisfying. But when I approach that task, I do so as puzzled by some kinds of selfishness as I am by some kinds of altruism. If that sounds strange, perhaps I'm instinctively drawn to some particular non-egoistic theory without being aware of it.

[Wombat]

Elendil,
Thanks for the long and detailed reply. I need to get to sleep so I can only make a couple of points here. I'll try to do better tomorrow.

First, I don't think that a deep and fully satisfying theory of human motivation is easy to come by. Had I thought that, I'd have that theory and I'd have shared it with you. What I do think is that we don't need such a theory to make progress in undermining egoism.

Second, I think we have diametrically opposed approaches to methodolgy in philosophy. My interest in philosophy is primarily an interest in solving problems. I prefer to start with as few theoretical commitments as possible and to add commitments only when a problem forces me to do so. I suppose my approach is in certain respects Cartesian although I would never have said that had your post not drawn it out. In general, I distrust ideology and endorse only what I can't do without. This is very terse but, for me, ideology is always at the end of the road, never at the beginning. For me all the fun is in the travelling. If I reach the end of some particular road fine; I don't hate ideology. But if I never reach the end of the road, I'm happy to learn what I can along the way.

Maybe I'll have a go at answering specific points tomorrow if I don't think the answers are obvious from what I've just written.

Added as an afterthought: btw, I have some published papers in highly technical metaphysics to my name. I endorse some metaphysical theses and reject others. I see no contradiction at all between that fact and anything I have just written.

[jim stone]

Jim, my claim wasn't that no altruistic acts are puzzling and in need of special explanation but only that some aren't. To be sure, a common sense understanding of deliberation would expect me to give some extra weight to a goal simply because it is my goal just as it would expect me to give some extra weight to a goal simply because it is the goal of a friend or a loved one. Common sense principles of deliberation don't say how much extra weight these considerations should carry; to that extent common sense rational decision making is an art, not a science. A utilitarian who really would sacrifice self or family for a tiny gain to someone he'd never met would indeed puzzle us.

My claim simply was that smallish personal sacrifices to further the interests of those around us are not puzzling unless one has a theoretical reason to find them puzzling. So citing cases of sacrifices for people I've never met is beside the point. We each of us inhabit, first and foremost, a local moral world. I don't find altruism towards those who share that world very puzzling at all.

That said, every philosopher will want a deep account of human motivation that feels satisfying. But when I approach that task, I do so as puzzled by some kinds of selfishness as I am by some kinds of altruism. If that sounds strange, perhaps I'm instinctively drawn to some particular non-egoistic theory without being aware of it.

This all makes sense to me. My difficulty is that small sacrifices
for the sake of friend's and loved ones aren't for me clearly
altruistic. To take a dramatic example, we don't typically
describe as 'altruistic' ' unselfish' or 'selfless' the
efforts of parents to save a child from some catastrophe,
even at the risk of their own lives. Where there is personal
attachment to something, it's in my interest to protect it.
I preserve something which I hold dear and to do so
is one of the reasons I act.

Perhaps this isn't pure Hobbes--it isn't that my attachment to
my child is cashed in merely in terms of other 'selfish'
concerns--that she will support me when I get old, etc.
Rather it seems to me that my self doesn't end at the
end of my body, it includes those things to which I am
personally attached. I am the sum of those things the
loss of which I would grieve. That includes
family, friends, I'm afraid in my case some musical
artifacts, perhaps even my nation. For some
of these people, those to whom I'm attached, those
who I love personally, their interests can have
the force of my interests. Again if I forgo
luxuries I desire in order to save for my child's education,
so that she can have opportunites I didn't,
we wouldn't typically describe this as altruistic
or selfless--for her success is as dear to me
personally as my success.

The case of people I've never met is relevant,
I think, because it's paradigmatically altruistic.
If paradigmatically altruistic acts are puzzling,
there is a theoretical problem about altruism.
Thanks so much for your observations. Best

[Jerry Freeman]

I don't see any mystery to it at all.

Perhaps some of the problem with getting my point across is, the idea of what the "self" is may not be easily conveyed. The only way I can explain this is in terms of subjective experience ...

"Here. Experience the world thusly. See how that feels? Now compare how it feels to experience the world this other way. See the difference? If you experience the world this way, those people over there seem very close to you, and you can feel what they're feeling as if it were happening to you directly. If you experience the world that other way, those people over there hardly even seem like people at all. In the first case, you're naturally motivated to act on behalf of those people over there, because how they feel affects how you feel. In the second case, you're not motivated to help them, because their joy and sorrow, gain and loss, pleasure and pain have no effect on your own."

This is a way of trying to illustrate what I mean by the sense of self including or not including the "other." This does quite easily explain altruism, and it explains why some may tend to be more altruistic and some may tend to be more "selfish." I've enclosed "selfish" in quotes because the explanation I've given for altruism defines a "selfish" motivation for it.

Best wishes,
Jerry

[Jerry Freeman]

Jim,

It appears we were both composing our latest comments at the same time.

I believe we are very close to being on the same page. What I'm saying is that some people are more capable of a sense that all humanity, all living things or even all creation, are as dear as one's own children (or one's own self). If one can conceive of such a state of awareness, then I think there's no puzzle at all.

Best wishes,
Jerry

[Lorenzo]

Years ago, when I was in college, I was travelling through Wyoming on my way back to school in Missouri. It was winter. I got caught in an unexpected snow storm and pulled into a motel for the night. It snowed all day and all night. In the morning, I looked outside and the motel was filled with stranded travelers, including a large caravan of religious teachers, doctors of philosophy and divinity, all headed for some "eastern" convention in Colorado.

What I witnessed, startled me.

Some local cowboy, who had whiskey on his breath, was out in the freezing cold, putting on tire chains for everyone in the parking lot who had chains and pulling others out of the snowbanks with his 4x4. None of these religious leaders seemed to have a clue what to do out there, 5 deg. below zero and wind blowing 30 mph--but they did have their theology right and did understand the mechanics of kindness and virtue, and knew how to thank god for unselfish people.

One old geezer walked out and offered the cowboy a religious book as a thank-you. He politely accepted it too, but left it in the resaurant for someone else, after breakfast. I'd guess that people with a nature like that don't need books, conventions, schools, etc.

[elendil]

wombat wrote:

First, I don't think that a deep and fully satisfying theory of human motivation is easy to come by. Had I thought that, I'd have that theory and I'd have shared it with you. What I do think is that we don't need such a theory to make progress in undermining egoism.

1. Agreed. 2. I'm sure of that. 3. Agreed, but... if we wish to make progress in proposing an alternative then I think that we do need to address the problem of basic theory. I guess I'm coming from a somewhat different direction, in that my basic concern is not directly with human motivation, although that does enter into it for me.

wombat wrote:

Second, I think we have diametrically opposed approaches to methodolgy in philosophy. My interest in philosophy is primarily an interest in solving problems. I prefer to start with as few theoretical commitments as possible and to add commitments only when a problem forces me to do so. I suppose my approach is in certain respects Cartesian although I would never have said that had your post not drawn it out. In general, I distrust ideology and endorse only what I can't do without. This is very terse but, for me, ideology is always at the end of the road, never at the beginning. For me all the fun is in the travelling. If I reach the end of some particular road fine; I don't hate ideology. But if I never reach the end of the road, I'm happy to learn what I can along the way.

1. Yes, we are coming from different directions. I would characterize my interest not so much as problem solving--as in crosswords--as seeking understanding.
2. I would differ with your characterization of Descartes, I think. I see Descartes as arrogantly applying the methodology of mathematics--the field in which he had experienced significant success--to problems that are non-mathematical in nature. (Cf. Gilson's The Unity of Philosophical Experience) The arrogance comes in with his dismissal of previous thought and his assumption that he could provide answers without serious study beyond what he had done to that point. The result: he based his philosophy on a non sequitur. He should have said: Sum, ergo cogito. If he had, he might have provided a real service to humanity, because he would have returned the focus of philosophy to where it should begin: the act of existing. I don't see seeking a secure starting point as piling up extraneous theoretical commitments, but as a humble and prudent procedure designed precisely to eliminate ideological considerations (but cf. #3). To do otherwise seems rash to me--kind of like my usual procedure of jumping into threads on the chiffboard midstream without bothering to read the earlier posts.
3. I use "ideology" to mean pretty much the opposite of "philosophy." If philosophy is the love of wisdom, ideology (as I use the term) is the pursuit of power through the manipulation of concepts. Contrast Plato, Aristotle and Aquinas with Hegel and Marx. (Cf. Voegelin's article "Hegel as Sorcerer" and his small book Science, Politics and Gnosticism. Maritain has a chapter on this topic in Peasant of the Garonne--he uses the term ideosopher to characterize most modern thinkers. Also, Hans Jonas has an excellent article on Heidegger in the same regard in The Phenomenon of Life.)
4. My big problem with much of the current work in philosophy is that it seems to assume that it can proceed by basically clarifying the meaning of words and applying logic, without paying much attention to history and other social sciences. I guess that's part of our Enlightenment heritage. The result, in my opinion, has been one philosophical trainwreck after another, leading in a very direct way to the orgy of violence in the 20th century. That's over simplified, of course, and the stock response is to point, with Hobbes et alios, to the record of the European wars of religion. My answer to that is to argue that those wars too resulted from the triumph of ideology over philosophy.

I certainly appreciate your good intentions, but I do question your approach. I realize (through long experience) that my approach is suspect (or just plain tiresome) to many people, but I also realize (through equally long experience) the truth of what Voegelin said: "The attack on metaphysics can be undertaken with good conscience only from the safe distance of imperfect knowledge." Sadly the problem may really be with imperfect knowledge rather than bad intentions: a lot of people sincerely think it would be a waste of time to even inquire into these issues.

Preemptive note to Stoner: despite my references to Voegelin and Jonas, I have not become a phenomenologist. For me, phenomenology is part of the problem, or certainly symptomatic of the problem, rather than part of the solution except to the extent that some from that school have provided incisive critiques of the modern malaise. I don't see their solutions as particularly helpful, although some prominent Churchmen (who should know better ) are infatuated with phenomenology.

Note to Lorenzo: I used to have an inclination to idealize the instinctive goodness of "simple" people, too, but time after time I've been let down by such people or have seen them take a powder when it comes to moral decisions more complicated than putting chains on tires for strangers.