Did anybody try to PM me?
- Wombat
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Did anybody try to PM me?
Earlier today I got an email message saying a new PM had arrived but, if it got sent, I didn't receive it. So, if you were expecting a reply, better try again.
- Bloomfield
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Yes, that was me. Here is my pm:
I decided I needed to think about it a bit more.Bloomfield wrote:If truth consists in the accordance of a cognition with its
object, this object must be, ipso facto, distinguished from all
others; for a cognition is false if it does not accord with the object
to which it relates, although it contains something which may be
affirmed of other objects. Now an universal criterion of truth would
be that which is valid for all cognitions, without distinction of
their objects. But it is evident that since, in the case of such a
criterion, we make abstraction of all the content of a cognition (that
is, of all relation to its object), and truth relates precisely to
this content, it must be utterly absurd to ask for a mark of the truth
of this content of cognition; and that, accordingly, a sufficient,
and at the same time universal, test of truth cannot possibly be found.
As we have already termed the content of a cognition its matter, we
shall say: "Of the truth of our cognitions in respect of their matter,
no universal test can be demanded, because such a demand is
self-contradictory."
/Bloomfield
-
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- Location: somewhere, over the rainbow, and Ergoville, USA
You suck.Bloomfield wrote:Yes, that was me. Here is my pm:
I decided I needed to think about it a bit more.Bloomfield wrote:If truth consists in the accordance of a cognition with its
object, this object must be, ipso facto, distinguished from all
others; for a cognition is false if it does not accord with the object
to which it relates, although it contains something which may be
affirmed of other objects. Now an universal criterion of truth would
be that which is valid for all cognitions, without distinction of
their objects. But it is evident that since, in the case of such a
criterion, we make abstraction of all the content of a cognition (that
is, of all relation to its object), and truth relates precisely to
this content, it must be utterly absurd to ask for a mark of the truth
of this content of cognition; and that, accordingly, a sufficient,
and at the same time universal, test of truth cannot possibly be found.
As we have already termed the content of a cognition its matter, we
shall say: "Of the truth of our cognitions in respect of their matter,
no universal test can be demanded, because such a demand is
self-contradictory."
- dubhlinn
- Posts: 6746
- Joined: Sun May 23, 2004 2:04 pm
- antispam: No
- Location: North Lincolnshire, UK.
Me tooBloomfield wrote:Yes, that was me. Here is my pm:
I decided I needed to think about it a bit more.Bloomfield wrote:If truth consists in the accordance of a cognition with its
object, this object must be, ipso facto, distinguished from all
others; for a cognition is false if it does not accord with the object
to which it relates, although it contains something which may be
affirmed of other objects. Now an universal criterion of truth would
be that which is valid for all cognitions, without distinction of
their objects. But it is evident that since, in the case of such a
criterion, we make abstraction of all the content of a cognition (that
is, of all relation to its object), and truth relates precisely to
this content, it must be utterly absurd to ask for a mark of the truth
of this content of cognition; and that, accordingly, a sufficient,
and at the same time universal, test of truth cannot possibly be found.
As we have already termed the content of a cognition its matter, we
shall say: "Of the truth of our cognitions in respect of their matter,
no universal test can be demanded, because such a demand is
self-contradictory."
Slan,
D.
And many a poor man that has roved,
Loved and thought himself beloved,
From a glad kindness cannot take his eyes.
W.B.Yeats
Loved and thought himself beloved,
From a glad kindness cannot take his eyes.
W.B.Yeats
- TomB
- Posts: 2124
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- Location: East Hartford, CT
Gee, why, you could not have stated your position more clearly.Bloomfield wrote:Yes, that was me. Here is my pm:
I decided I needed to think about it a bit more.Bloomfield wrote:If truth consists in the accordance of a cognition with its
object, this object must be, ipso facto, distinguished from all
others; for a cognition is false if it does not accord with the object
to which it relates, although it contains something which may be
affirmed of other objects. Now an universal criterion of truth would
be that which is valid for all cognitions, without distinction of
their objects. But it is evident that since, in the case of such a
criterion, we make abstraction of all the content of a cognition (that
is, of all relation to its object), and truth relates precisely to
this content, it must be utterly absurd to ask for a mark of the truth
of this content of cognition; and that, accordingly, a sufficient,
and at the same time universal, test of truth cannot possibly be found.
As we have already termed the content of a cognition its matter, we
shall say: "Of the truth of our cognitions in respect of their matter,
no universal test can be demanded, because such a demand is
self-contradictory."
All the Best, Tom
"Consult the Book of Armaments"
- izzarina
- Posts: 6759
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well said, Bloom...I thinkBloomfield wrote:Yes, that was me. Here is my pm:
I decided I needed to think about it a bit more.Bloomfield wrote:If truth consists in the accordance of a cognition with its
object, this object must be, ipso facto, distinguished from all
others; for a cognition is false if it does not accord with the object
to which it relates, although it contains something which may be
affirmed of other objects. Now an universal criterion of truth would
be that which is valid for all cognitions, without distinction of
their objects. But it is evident that since, in the case of such a
criterion, we make abstraction of all the content of a cognition (that
is, of all relation to its object), and truth relates precisely to
this content, it must be utterly absurd to ask for a mark of the truth
of this content of cognition; and that, accordingly, a sufficient,
and at the same time universal, test of truth cannot possibly be found.
As we have already termed the content of a cognition its matter, we
shall say: "Of the truth of our cognitions in respect of their matter,
no universal test can be demanded, because such a demand is
self-contradictory."
Someday, everything is gonna be diff'rent
When I paint my masterpiece.
When I paint my masterpiece.
Bloomfield,
I think it's fine as far as it goes...but shouldn't you consider adding something like the following?
On the other hand, with regard to our cognition in respect of its mere form (excluding all content), it is equally manifest that logic, in so far as it exhibits the universal and necessary laws of the understanding, must in these very laws present us with criteria of truth. Whatever contradicts these rules is false, because thereby the understanding is made to contradict its own universal laws of thought; that is, to contradict itself. These criteria, however, apply solely to the form of truth, that is, of thought in general, and in so far they are perfectly accurate, yet not sufficient. For although a cognition may be perfectly accurate as to logical form, that is, not self-contradictory, it is notwithstanding quite possible that it may not stand in agreement with its object. Consequently, the merely logical criterion of truth, namely, the accordance of a cognition with the universal and formal laws of understanding and reason, is nothing more than the conditio sine qua non, or negative condition of all truth. Farther than this logic cannot go, and the error which depends not on the form, but on the content of the cognition, it has no test to discover.
You know, to give the other side...
Just a thought; it's your business, of course.
Carol
I think it's fine as far as it goes...but shouldn't you consider adding something like the following?
On the other hand, with regard to our cognition in respect of its mere form (excluding all content), it is equally manifest that logic, in so far as it exhibits the universal and necessary laws of the understanding, must in these very laws present us with criteria of truth. Whatever contradicts these rules is false, because thereby the understanding is made to contradict its own universal laws of thought; that is, to contradict itself. These criteria, however, apply solely to the form of truth, that is, of thought in general, and in so far they are perfectly accurate, yet not sufficient. For although a cognition may be perfectly accurate as to logical form, that is, not self-contradictory, it is notwithstanding quite possible that it may not stand in agreement with its object. Consequently, the merely logical criterion of truth, namely, the accordance of a cognition with the universal and formal laws of understanding and reason, is nothing more than the conditio sine qua non, or negative condition of all truth. Farther than this logic cannot go, and the error which depends not on the form, but on the content of the cognition, it has no test to discover.
You know, to give the other side...
Just a thought; it's your business, of course.
Carol
- dubhlinn
- Posts: 6746
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That explains everything,cskinner wrote:Bloomfield,
I think it's fine as far as it goes...but shouldn't you consider adding something like the following?
On the other hand, with regard to our cognition in respect of its mere form (excluding all content), it is equally manifest that logic, in so far as it exhibits the universal and necessary laws of the understanding, must in these very laws present us with criteria of truth. Whatever contradicts these rules is false, because thereby the understanding is made to contradict its own universal laws of thought; that is, to contradict itself. These criteria, however, apply solely to the form of truth, that is, of thought in general, and in so far they are perfectly accurate, yet not sufficient. For although a cognition may be perfectly accurate as to logical form, that is, not self-contradictory, it is notwithstanding quite possible that it may not stand in agreement with its object. Consequently, the merely logical criterion of truth, namely, the accordance of a cognition with the universal and formal laws of understanding and reason, is nothing more than the conditio sine qua non, or negative condition of all truth. Farther than this logic cannot go, and the error which depends not on the form, but on the content of the cognition, it has no test to discover.
You know, to give the other side...
Just a thought; it's your business, of course.
Carol
Thanks Carol.
Slan,
D.
And many a poor man that has roved,
Loved and thought himself beloved,
From a glad kindness cannot take his eyes.
W.B.Yeats
Loved and thought himself beloved,
From a glad kindness cannot take his eyes.
W.B.Yeats
- Bloomfield
- Posts: 8225
- Joined: Mon Oct 15, 2001 6:00 pm
- antispam: No
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- Location: Location: Location:
Fair enough. And I've considered it. But really, if I'd go that far, I'd like to take the next step, reference the Organon and call the general logic dialectic. Just a thought, of course.cskinner wrote:Bloomfield,
I think it's fine as far as it goes...but shouldn't you consider adding something like the following?
On the other hand, with regard to our cognition in respect of its mere form (excluding all content), it is equally manifest that logic, in so far as it exhibits the universal and necessary laws of the understanding, must in these very laws present us with criteria of truth. Whatever contradicts these rules is false, because thereby the understanding is made to contradict its own universal laws of thought; that is, to contradict itself. These criteria, however, apply solely to the form of truth, that is, of thought in general, and in so far they are perfectly accurate, yet not sufficient. For although a cognition may be perfectly accurate as to logical form, that is, not self-contradictory, it is notwithstanding quite possible that it may not stand in agreement with its object. Consequently, the merely logical criterion of truth, namely, the accordance of a cognition with the universal and formal laws of understanding and reason, is nothing more than the conditio sine qua non, or negative condition of all truth. Farther than this logic cannot go, and the error which depends not on the form, but on the content of the cognition, it has no test to discover.
You know, to give the other side...
Just a thought; it's your business, of course.
Carol
/Bloomfield
Hey, look. It's your private exchange with Wombat anyway. If you feel you must drag in the Organon and all that, then go for it. I kant stop you.Bloomfield wrote: Fair enough. And I've considered it. But really, if I'd go that far, I'd like to take the next step, reference the Organon and call the general logic dialectic. Just a thought, of course.
Carol, using the raspberry emoticon for the first time in her life