Bloomfield wrote:jim stone wrote:Scientific considerations about theory construction
which apply in science 'proper' apply in metaphsics too.
So Inference to the best explanation applies in metaphysics too.
The version of the Cosmo Argument won't provide a terribly forceful argument for
a non-Contingent being, it's no proof,
still I think it provides some
support.
See this is where you lose me. (And presentism is cute, but doesn't strike me as particularly relevant. The fact that it is "generally considered" a metaphysical theory isn't enough to use it as the strawman for metaphysics in general.)
The reason why inference to the best explanation is problematic is metaphysics is that (by definition) there is no observation in metaphysics. In science you take your empirical observation and you try to subsume it under different theories. Makes sense (perhaps) that the theory that explains the observation most simply and elegantly should be prefered over another (barring further observation of course).
But in metaphysics you are dealing with the conditions and nature of observation itself. Meaning that you cannot subsume anything under your theory. So inference to the best theory is mere a veiled circularity or value judgment: a means of hiding the ball and lending supposed dignity to the result we were trying to prove all along.
You see, I disbelieve that (by definition) there is no observation
in metaphysics. Sometimes there is and sometimes there isn't.
One can, of course, define 'metaphysics' in that way, but what I
have in mind as metaphysics are issues (often about the fundamental
nature of reality (ontology)) that are viewed as metaphysics
by metaphysicians.
So for example, a paradigmatic metaphysical question is whether
there is a persisting self or subject of experiences. David Hume
argued that there is no such thing--a metaphysical thesis--
based chiefly on observation. If one introspects, Hume said,
one finds only experiences and thoughts, never a subject,
and nothing in the stream persists. The illusion of a persisting
self, Hume maintained, is created by the fact that we fail to attend carefully
to what's going on inside us, and therefore slur different mental
states into one--rather like a movie running slowly on a screen,
where, if one looks at it from the corner of one's eye, one has
the illusion of motion, but if one looks at it squarely, one sees
the separate frames. A consequence of Hume's view is that
anybody who spends a long time introspecting carefully
will likely reach the conclusion that there is nobody in
the experiential stream, which is precisely what happens
in Buddhist meditation. In addition, Hume maintained that
we don't need to posit an underlying self to explain what
we do find in experience. So here we have a paradigmatic
metaphysical thesis, there is no persisting self, that, from the
first, was argued for principally on the basis of observation--
on empirical grounds.
Another paradigmatic metaphysical question is whether mental
states are physical states--is the mind the body/brain or
something extra? Now obviously what we discover in
neurology and biology is relevant here. If mental states
are going to be identified with (or reduced to) brain states,
then, when my thoughts or sensations change, my brain
had better change as well. If the physical world doesn't
change when the mind does, there is no hope of reducing
mental states to physical states. So, once again, observation
is relevant in evaluating a paradigmatic
metaphysical theory.
What I believe is that there is one major effort--to understand
the nature of reality by use of the intellect. The same
constraints are operating throughout--observation will
be brought to bear when we can use it, but sometimes it
cannot. We want
ontologically simple theories, with lots of explanatory power,
that don't lead to paradoxes, and which intuitively explain
the phenomena. And we want those theories to square
with experience, where we can get it. Inference to the
best explanation is operating throughout.
So, for example, if you look at the world one of the first
things you notice is that there are kinds of things,
cats, cows, kangaroos, water, earth, air--and cats have
kittens, not calves. What explains this fact? Plato
maintained that there are entities called Forms
which things of the same kind participate in, in
virtue of which they are the same kind. Cats are
cats because they participate in the form CAT.
Green things are green because they participate
in the form GREEN. The form GREEN is itself
green he said--the perfect green.
Now one objection to this theory, is this: wherever things
have something in common, there is something extra,
a form, that they have in common. That's the theory.
But as the Form Green is itself green, green things and
the form have something in common, so there is a
second Form Green, which is also green, and so
we have a vicious infinite regress of green forms. And so on
for the other forms. A good deal of the force of the objection
(which may or may not be a good one) is this: the commonality
of things, there being of the same kind, which the theory means
to explain, is never explained by invoking a form, because
the SAME commonality will arise between the form and
the things that are supposed to share in it. So the theory
of forms fails to explain what it is meant to explain.
This is 'abductive reasoning'--what counts against the
theory of forms is that it plainly isn't the best explanation of
commonality; it would be more plausible if it were.
Again, suppose we reject Hume and say that we are indeed
persisting things. In virtue of what do we persist (what explains
our persistence)? Suppose we say it's psychological continuity.
I am the person I was yesterday because my mental states
are caused by and resemble his; that's why I'm him.
A consequence of this is that I am distinct from the human
animal typing these words. For I exist in the past only so
far as I am psychologically continuous; but the animal
existed before it was even sentient. So it preceded me.
But then, there are two things here typing these words
and thinking these thoughts--me and the human creature.
What in the world is my relationship to him? The objection
is that this explanation of my persistence through time
is not the best explanation--because it raises more questions
than it answers. It's simpler ontologically to identify me with
this animal; that's a better, simpler, less problematic explanation.
