jim stone wrote:That's rather how later Buddhism went, Emmline,
but the Buddha's teaching was different.
It isn't that we are one with anything;
rather it's that when you look within
you find that nothing lasts long enough
to be you. It isn't that we become a
Big Self; it's that nature is impersonal
through and through. Empty phenomena
rolling on.
Yes, dependent orgination is all very well and good, but I, personally, see the tendency toward identification with "everything" as just another attempt to wring meaning out of the meaningless. (That is, I see "meaning" as coming entirely from within. It doesn't need to be justified.)
Another way of looking at no-self is that everything (every thing) is a temporary composite of elements that are, themselves, temporary composites. I wrote a little something about it in an email to a friend (the same one I recommended to Cranberry), and it ended up at
http://mysite.verizon.net/trcbmc/id35.html though I didn't write it with the idea of having it published.
The identity of one of these "composites" as a unitary "thing" is, as Jim said, a useful fiction. In truth, our brains are "designed" to construct these entities out of the great seething mass of sensory input. This is particularly clear with regard to the visual system. Our eyes, optic nerves, and brains add emphasis to very particular facets of the overall visual experience while ignoring others. Edges and colors are experienced separately at the input level, and are then bound into visual objects, and we can scarecly escape the feeling of unity in those objects, even when our own analysis shows that unity to have no deep foundation.
But even our mental objects change with time. Our memories fade and shift. We may even remember events with details that never happened. Still, our mental objects commonly outlive the external circumstances that gave rise to them. They have a persistence and generate a feeling of reality that is extremely convincing and that seems intuitively "real".
Darwin, I just saw Dan Dennett a couple
of weeks ago. He gave a lecture here
in St. Louis.
I've been a big Dennett fan for a long time, so it was interesting to read Paul Churchland's
On the Contrary: Critical Essays, 1987-1997, "Chapter 12. Filling In: Why Dennett is Wrong", which is a classic case of scientific data "disproving" philosophical logic. (It's about Dennett's contention that the brain deals with the visual blind spot by simply ignoring it, while it seems that the evidence makes it clear that the brain actually "fills in" the missing data.)
I must say that his
Self and Identity, which I read as part of a "Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence" class about a dozen years ago, seems pretty dated now. It's part of why I prefer the uncertainty of science and Buddhism to the certainty of philosophers.
The Damasio book
you mentioned is said to be very good.
I enjoyed it. It fits nicely with Pinker's book (as do the later Churchland works). His starting point is Phineas Gage, who lost part of his brain in an explosion that put an iron bar through his head. When I started reading it, I realized that I had seen a drawing of his skull, showing how the bar had penetrated it, in a copy of
Ripley's Believe It or Not that we had back in the late '40s or early '50s.