OT: Egoism vs. Altruism

[jim stone]

I'm an eogist and won't admit defeat.
Wait'll you hear from my wife.

Altruists, anti-cartesians, you
are all in deep doo doo!

[jim stone]

Here's what my wife says:

The new science needed a new metaphysical foundation,
because they were rejecting the Aristotelian metaphysical
foundation. In the new science there was no place for
final causes or substantial forms. Descartes is one of
the new scientists, he was one of the 'mechanists,'
he was dissecting corpses, watching Galileo carefully,
he knew the new astronomy and he was in touch
with these people.

Descartes's Dualism was very important for
the establishment of the new science because, by
separating soul from matter and making each its
own substance, matter became a substance in its
own right. We explain the features of material objects
by looking at the features and parts of material
objects. We no longer have to talk about form,
for Descartes has taken form (soul) out of matter.
Natural phenomema are to be explained by matter
in motion and by efficient causes.

The new science was an empirical science;
Aristotelian science was armchair science,
non empirical (they really didn't think they needed
to do experiments). For the new science to flourish,
sense perception needed to be vindicated as a
source of knowledge in the sciences. Descartes's point isn't
to deduce scientific knowledge from mathematical
principles, but to vindicate the aposteriori method
of observation and experiment as a window
to the natural world. The method of radical
doubt isn't intended as a scientific method or
a mathematical method--it's point is to show
that even if the skeptic about sense perception
is given every advantage (we will reject as
false everything we can find rational reason to
doubt, no matter how probable it is), we still can arrive
at indubitable certainties sufficient to
vindicate the trustworthiness of
sense experinece and experiment,
what we now call 'scientific method.'

Descartes was, by the way, well versed in
the history of philosophy, he knew Aquinas very well
and Aristotle too.
That's from the Boss. Best

[elendil]

Most of the post that I'm responding to doesn't really speak to my main point, which had to do with continuities in human thought through the ages. I'm simply not interested in Descartes for his own sake, merely as an illustration of a common human tendency. However, I'll respond to some of the issues that were raised.

Stoner's Boss wrote:

The new science needed a new metaphysical foundation,
because they were rejecting the Aristotelian metaphysical
foundation. In the new science there was no place for
final causes or substantial forms. Descartes is one of
the new scientists, he was one of the 'mechanists,'
he was dissecting corpses, watching Galileo carefully,
he knew the new astronomy and he was in touch
with these people.

All this may be true and yet not argue against the fact that his whole system, as Gilson says, was set up in a consciously mathematical manner--his goal was to reduce all problems so that they were "almost similar to those of mathematics." That is Gilson quoting Descartes, and if you consult The Unity of Philosophical Experience you'll find ample documentation of this point--over and above what I cited in my previous post. And toward the end of this post I give my reasons for believing that Gilson is, in fact, a reliable authority on Descartes.

Stoner's Boss wrote:

Descartes's Dualism was very important for
the establishment of the new science because, by
separating soul from matter and making each its
own substance, matter became a substance in its
own right. We explain the features of material objects
by looking at the features and parts of material
objects. We no longer have to talk about form,
for Descartes has taken form (soul) out of matter.
Natural phenomema are to be explained by matter
in motion and by efficient causes.

I don't believe I have any problem with that.

Stoner's Boss wrote:

The new science was an empirical science;
Aristotelian science was armchair science,
non empirical (they really didn't think they needed
to do experiments). For the new science to flourish,
sense perception needed to be vindicated as a
source of knowledge in the sciences. Descartes's point isn't
to deduce scientific knowledge from mathematical
principles, but to vindicate the aposteriori method
of observation and experiment as a window
to the natural world.

Part of the problem in interpreting the thought of a real person lies in reconciling inconsistent statements. As a matter of history, I don't believe the burgeoning "new science" was at all in need of Descartes as a defender or even as a proponent. If you consult The Unity of Philosophical Experience, Gilson can provide chapter and verse for Descartes' intentions as regards his universal method of inquiry. Gilson also provides an instructive example of Descartes' disastrous application of his method to physics and biology:

"When Descartes died, Leibniz, who had already been born, was destined to prove that the Cartesian laws of motion were mathematically wrong, from which it followed that, grounded as it was on erroneous mechanics, Cartesian physics had no scientific value whatsoever. Yet, what has perhaps been the most striking of Descartes' scientific failures took place already during his own lifetime. W. Harvey had just discovered the circulation of the blood, and the modest little book wherein he submitted his conclusions to the learned world (1628) will always remain as a perfect example of scientific demonstration. Harvey was no less admirable in not explaining what he did not understand than in clearing up all the rest. Descartes read the book, and immediately took sides with Harvey, against those who were opposing his conclusions. He certainly could see the truth when he forgot his universal mathematics. The trouble was that Harvey's description of the motion of the heart, still today perfectly correct, could not very well fit in with the mechanical biology of Descartes. The learned world was then called upon to witness that surprising spectacle: Descartes, who had not discovered the circulation of the blood, explaining it to Harvey, who had made the discovery, and adding to it as many mistakes as he was adding explanations. Yet, Descartes was so sure of himself that he made public his wrong theory in the fifth part of his Discourse, where it is expounded at length as a perfect instance of mathematical demonstration in biology. A more blindly trusted method never took anybody to more consistently wrong conclusions.

"There would be no excuse for reviewing the failures of such a great man as Descartes, were it not done for other purposes than to debase him..." (pp.118-119)

Furthermore, while I'm no scientist, it seems to me that there has arisen in the late 20th century a new "new science." One that sees a place for final cause. I'm not current on the Darwinian debates, but I believe that finality enters into them in a fairly major way. The Anthropic Principle, and so forth. I know that there are some pretty eminent characters (scientifically speaking) out there who are involved in reintroducing finality. Interestingly, virtually any Darwinian you care to actually speak to constantly introduces finality and purpose into their conversation, despite the fact that they're supposed to hold to a theory of random mutation. I think Einstein's famous remark to the effect that God doesn't play at dice also implicates finality. Finally, the whole philosophy of science school has, if nothing else, amply demonstrated that the theory and reality of scientific activity are two quite distinct things. I'm fairly confident that Swinburn's (sp.?) views involve finality and purpose as well. So, there definitely seem to be new currents of thought on these matters.

Stoner's Boss wrote:

The method of radical
doubt isn't intended as a scientific method or
a mathematical method--it's point is to show
that even if the skeptic about sense perception
is given every advantage (we will reject as
false everything we can find rational reason to
doubt, no matter how probable it is), we still can arrive
at indubitable certainties sufficient to
vindicate the trustworthiness of
sense experinece and experiment,
what we now call 'scientific method.'

I think the methodic doubt was intended to "clear the decks," so to speak, in preparation for Descartes' universal method. Descartes was proposing something more grandiose than merely a method of scientific enquiry--and remember, in any case, actual scientists had established the proper method already and had no particular need for Descartes' help. No, Descartes was seeking to refute Montaigne's skepticism and to provide a certain and indubitable basis for all human knowledge whatsoever. I hope we can agree on that. Gilson makes several points. The first is that methodic doubt such as Descartes proposes is simply unwarranted. The second is that it is exceedingly unwise even as a polemical device because, as a matter of fact, it is not possible to "arrive at indubitable certainties sufficient to vindicate the trustworthiness of sense experinece and experiment" while starting with the methodic doubt. In support of his position Gilson uses history as a sort of laboratory, illustrating with numerous examples the how philosopers who attempt to vindicate Descartes' use of a methodic doubt instead fall prey to skepticism. But he also addresses why a solution is impossible in principle. All this is laid out in Thomist Realism and the Critique of Knowledge (1939), which studies the disastrous effects on "Thomisms" that adopt Cartesian or Kantian principles yet seek to reach Thomist conclusions. It also contains two chapters in which Gilson expounds his own position. I won't summarize that here but will simply recommend that you refer to the book, which is written with Gilson's distinctive Gallic lucidity. (Another highlight of this book is the excellence of the translation and the introduction.) Among other topics that Gilson addresses are the distinctions between principles, postulates, and presuppositions, and in that regard you may wish to consult Alasdair MacIntyre's Aquinas Lecture for 1990, First Principles, Final Ends and Contemporary Philosophical Issues, in which MacIntyre cites Thomist Realism...

Stoner's Boss wrote:

Descartes was, by the way, well versed in
the history of philosophy, he knew Aquinas very well
and Aristotle too.

At this point we seem to have a conflict of authorities: Stoner's Boss against my Bosses, and above all, against Etienne Gilson. I can't claim to be an independent authority on Descartes, so in this circumstance I think it will be appropriate to cite Gilson's credentials as an authority on the life and thought of Descartes, and then present extended quotations of Gilson's evaluation of Descartes as well as supporting opinions of other recognized authorities. These, I hope, will speak to the question of how "well versed" Descartes was in the history of philosophy and, in particular, how accurate it is to say that Descartes "knew Aquinas very well." There are also a number of other issues that are addressed, that I believe were previously touched upon in this thread. I would not be me, of course, if I didn't add a few comments of my own, which I hope will be helpful.

Etienne Gilson (1884 -1978)
"A member of the Academie Francaise, Etienne Gilson is possibly the most renowned medievalist of his generation. He was professor of medieval philosophies in the Sorbonne and the College de France from 1921. He became also visiting professor of medieval thought at Harvard (1926) and at Toronto (1929). In the course of his long productive life he delivered, in addition to countless individual lectures, the following outstanding series: the Gifford Lectures in Aberdeen [The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy, 1931 - 1932]; the Henry James Lectures at Harvard [The Unity of Philosophical Experience, 1936]; the Powell Lectures at Bloomington, Indiana [God and Philosophy, 1939 - 1940]; the inaugural lectures of the Mercier Chair at Louvain; and the fourth series of the Mellon Lectures in the National Gallery, Washington. The published bibiography of Gilson's full-length books and articles...contains 1210 items...

"As a national figure, Gilson represented France at many international meetings: after World War I in London, Naples and Cambridge (Mass.); after Word War II at important conferences held in San Francisco (United Nations), London (UNESCO) and the Hague (United Europe). For two years he was a conseiller or senator in the French government."

This is a bibliography of Gilson's book-length writings that were devoted exclusively to Cartesian studies:

E. Gilson, La Liberte chez Descartes et la theologie (1913)
E. Gilson, Index scolastico-cartesien (1913)
E. Gilson, Descartes: Discours de la methode, texte et commentaire (1930) ["reprinted for decades"]
E. Gilson, Etudes sur le role de la pensee medievale dans la formation du system cartesien (1930)

As we will see, Gilson continued to write extensively about Descartes throughout his long and active life. I hope the following selection--autobiographical reflections by Gilson--will prove interesting, especially in that they have a direct bearing on his studies of Descartes which were triggered by the well known fact that Descartes borrowed freely from Scholastic terminology and sought to uphold Scholastic conclusions--as he understood them.

"If, in the following pages, Thomas Aquinas appears a bit too much like the deus ex machina of some abstract metaphysical drama, the ready objection will be that I have spoken as a Thomist, measuring all the other philosophies by the yardstick of Thomism. I beg at least to assure my readers that if I have done this--which is but too possible--I have committed what appears to me personally as the one unforgivable sin against the very essence of philosophy. Yet, before condemning me for such a crime, they will have to make sure that I have actually committed it.

"I was educated in a French Catholic college, which I left, after seven years of studies, without having heard even once, at least as far as I remmember, the name of Saint Thomas Aquinas. When the time came for me to study philosophy I went to a state-controlled college, whose professor of philosophy, a belated disciple of Victor Cousin, had certainly never read a line of Thomas Aquinas. At the Sorbonne, no one of my professors knew anything about his doctrine. All that I learned concerning it was that, were anyone enough of a fool to read it, he would find there an expression of that Scholasticism which, since the time of Descartes, had become a mere piece of mental archeology. To me, however, philosophy was neither Descartes nor even Kant; it was Bergson, the genius whose lectures still remain in my memory as so many hours of intellectual transfiguration...

"The man to whom I am indebted for my first knowledge of Saint Thomas was a Jew. He had never opened a single one of the works of Thomas, nor did he intend ever to do so...When, two years later, I went to him [Lucien Levy-Bruhl] for a subject of a thesis, he advised me to study the vocabulary and, eventually, the matter borrowed from Scholasticism by Descartes. ...its nine long years of preparation taught me two things: first, to read Saint Thomas Aquinas; secondly, that Descartes had vainly tried to solve, by means of his own famous method, philosophical problems whose only correct position and solution were inseparable from the method of Saint Thomas Aquinas.

"...Since, however, it had become clear to me that, technically speaking, the metaphysics of Descartes had largely been a clumsy overhauling of scholastic metaphysics, I decided to learn metaphysics from those who had really known it, namely, those very Schoolmen whom my own professors of philosophy felt the more free to despise as they had never read them." (God and Philosophy, Preface, xii - xiv, passim)

In the following passage Gilson comments on Descartes' attitude toward history in general as well as Descartes estimation of his own place in history.

"It is a well known fact that Descartes despised history...Had he ever so little investigated into the past of his own idea of God...Like the innate Ideas of Plato, Descartes' innate idea of God was a reminiscence; not however, the reminiscence of some idea contemplated by the soul in a former life, but simply the reminiscence of what he had learned in church when he was a little boy.

"This disconcerting indifference of Descartes toward the possible origin of so important a metaphysical idea is by no means a unique accident in his philosophy. Of the many things which had been said by his predecessors, a large number appeared to him as being at least materially true, and Descartes never hesitated to repeat them when it suited him to do so. To him, however, to repeat something never meant to borrow it. As Descartes himself saw it, the greatest merit of his own philosophy consisted in this, that because it was the first one to have consistently followed the only true method, it also was the only one to be a continuous chain of demonstrated consequesnces faultlessly drawn from evident principles." (God and Philosophy, pp. 82-83)

In Being and Some Philosophers Gilson traces Descartes' philosophical pedigree. Descartes was educated at the Jesuit College de La Fleche. His background in philosophy was strongly colored by the Jesuit nature of his education, because the Jesuits--who were embroiled in controversy with the Dominicans--presented what had become, in effect, their own official philosophy, which was that of Suarez. It is prima facie unlikely that Descartes had more than a nodding acquaintance with the Dominican Aquinas, and at any rate any presentation of Aquinas' work would have been strongly colored by Suarezian views. That continued to be the case down to the present century. Regarding the situation of Thomist studies in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, a readily available source is Alasdair MacIntyre's Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry. MacIntyre remarks, appropos of Descartes' philosophical tendencies, that "it was no accident that Descartes was taught by Jesuits influenced by Suarez" and adds that "It was a mark of the philosophical ingenuity of Kleutgen [the German Jesuit who is widely considered to be the author of Aeterni Patris, the encyclical that started the revival in Thomist studies in the late 19th century] that, having first misidentified Aquinas's [sic] central positions with those of Suarez..." (p. 75)

"Descartes, for instance, raised a strong protest against the bad habit, which then obtained among Scholastics, of obscuring what was self evident by defining, explaining and eventually proving it. When I say, 'I think, therefore I am,' why should I bother about explaining what existence is? Such notions as that of existence are in themselves quite simple and, besides, 'they don't help us in acquiring the knowledge of any existing thing.' And this is true, at least in so far as physical scinece is concerned; but Descartes' meaningful remark merely proves that what he himself was aiming at was not primarily metaphysics, but physics.

"This is why, when he happened to meet the problem of being and existence, Descartes simply held it for an already settle question. Himself a pupil of the Jesuits, he had learned metaphysics according to Suarez [the famous Spanish Jesuit, whose writings were also a significant influence on Christian Wolff, and through Wolff on Kant who, like Descartes and many, many others, mistook Suarez for Aquinas], and, though I would not bet that he had read the whole Metaphysicae Disputationes, there are positive reasons to feel sure that he knew the work, and I even believe that, for a time at least, he personally owned a copy of it. To Descartes, Scholastic philosophy was Suarez, and this is why, when confronted with the problem of existence, he flatly denied its distinction from essence." (Being and Some Philosophers, p. 109; 1952)

Before leaving Gilson, I would like to once again strongly recommend the two chapters on Descartes in The Unity of Philosophical Experience. I simply can't write them out in their entirety, and an outline would be too burdensome at this point.

The last two selections detailing Descartes' relationship to his predecessors are from The Primacy of Existence in Thomas Aquinas (translated with an introduction and notes by Benjamin S. Llamzon, 1966), which is a translation of Dominic Banez' [a Spanish Dominican, 1528 - 1604] commentary on Summa Theologiae, q. 3, art. 4, "Whether Essence and Existence are the Same in God."

"If we consider the shift in perspective from object to the thinking subject...we can readily appreciate the significance of Suarezian metaphysics as the metaphysics Descartes and Kant knew prior to their own moments of creative originality. [cites 4 authorities, including Gilson] Against Suarez and his school (to which Molina [the famous Jesuit moral philosopher]...belonged), Banez insisted on a return to the authentic teaching of Aquinas on the primacy of the act of existing over the so-called eternal, immutable, and necessary essences...Instead, an essentialistic scholasticism gained general acceptance and pushed its tide towards La Fleche and Konigsberg." (Introduction, pp. 9-10)

And to conclude, here is Banez' famous cri du coeur regarding the sad state of knowledge that obtained in his own time regarding Aquinas--a state that in some respects continues:

"Now this is exactly what St. Thomas has often insistently proclaimed, although Thomists will not listen: namely, that esse is the actuality of every form or nature." (Banez' commentary, p. 25)

[LeeMarsh]

I am no philosopher, nor am I schooled in such; however, I do want to make a few comments on the subject of self and altruism.

I believe that we have a need to reach beyond self, each 'I' searching to find that which is more than me. We reach; and, in so doing, we are being altruistic. The fact that we have other needs, such as food, warmth, or shelter; does not refute the reach nor its altruistic nature. If these needs take precedence, the reach is still not refuted. The fact that we drag ourselves along with the reach does not refute its altruistic nature. Weather our reach is successfull or not, does not refute its nature.

I may reach through simple acts of kindness.
I may reach through making commitments to friend or family.
I may reach by adopting an ideal or value that serves more than me.
I may reach by searching for a way to connect with others that lets me set aside me for a moment.

We reach.

Regardless what I think of the of the motivation, the reach is an attempt to extend beyond the self. Why do I see it this way? Folks reached to me.

They reached in simple acts of kindness.
They reached by making commitment to me as friend or family.
They reached by sharing ideals and values.
They reached by connecting to me in ways that let me set aside me for a moment.

Often I've proposed that music seeks to express that which is more than words, that which is more than can be understood in words. Music seeks to share a connection which is more than the individual understanding of any of the connected. If you define altruism as an unselfish interest in the welfare of others; then, I find music carries altruism as an overtone of each tune that connects us.

Perhaps the discussion of Egoism vs. Alturism is not Off Topic for a music forum. A forum where we seek to understand our connection to the music. A forum were we seek to connect with others that have our passion for the music. A forum of folks reaching for that which is more than themselves.

For what it gives you, or for what it lets you give ...

[jim stone]

Here is my friend John Cottingham, probably the leading
Cartesian scholar alive, the major translator of
Descartes's writings in the last 40 years, this from
the Cambridge Dictionary of philosophy. This isn't
meant to refute Gilson, but to put things in perhaps
a different perspective.

John after reviewing the Meditations,
writes:

In this central part of his philosophy, Descartes follows in a long tradition going back to Augsitine (with its ultimate roots in Plato) that in the first place is sketpical about the evidence of the senses as against the more reliable abstract perceptions of the intellect, and in the second place sees such intellectual knowledge as a kind of illumiknation derived from a higher source than man's own mind. Descartes frequently uses the ancient metaphor of the 'natural light' or 'light of reason' to convey this notion that the fundamental intuitions of the intellect are inherently reliable. The label 'rationalist', which is often applied to Descartes in this connection, can be misleading, since he certainly does not rely on reason ALONE: in the development of his scientific theories he allows a considerable role to empirical observation in the testing of hypotheses and in the understanding of the mechanisms of nature (his 'vortex theory' of planetary revolutions is based on observations of the behaviour of whirlpools).

What is ture, nonetheless, is that the fundamental building blocks of Cartesian science are the innate ideas (chiefly those of mathematics) whose reliabilty Descartes takes as guaranteed by thier having been implanted in the mind by God. ...

The scientifc system that Descartes had worked on before he wrote the Meditations and that he elaborated in his later work, the Principles of Philosophy, attempts wherever possible to reduce natural phenomena to the quantitative descriptions of arithmetic and geometry: 'my consideration of matter in corporeal things,' he says in the Principles 'involves absolutely nothing apart from divisions, shapes and motions.' This connects whith his metaphysical commitment to relying only on clear and distinct ideas. In place of the elaborate apparatus of the Scholastics, with its plethora of 'substantial forms' and 'real qualities,' Descartes proposes to matehmaticize science. The material world is simply an indefinite series of variations in the shape, size, and motion of the single, simple homogeneious matter that he termse res extensa (extended substance). Under this category he includes all physical and bioligcal events, even complex animal behaviour, which he regards as simply the result of purely mechanical processes. ....

(Lots of stuff follows about Dualism.)

Despite the philosophical difficulties that beset the Cartesian system, Descartes's vision of a unified understanding of reality has retained a powerful hold on scientists and philosophers ever since. His insistence that the path to progress in science lay in the direction of quatnitative explanations has been substantially vindicated. His attempt to construct a system of knowledge by starting from the subjective awareness of the conscious self has been equally important, if only because so much of the epistemology of our own time has been a reaction against the autocentric perspective from which Descartes starts out. ....Descartes's's insistence that the phenomena of conscious experience are recalcitrant to explanation in purely physical terms remains deeply influential, and the cluster of profound problems that he raised about the nature of the human mind and its relation to the material world are still very far from being
adequately solved.

[elendil]

Here is my friend John Cottingham, probably the leading
Cartesian scholar alive, the major translator of
Descartes's writings in the last 40 years, this from
the Cambridge Dictionary of philosophy.

This isn't meant to refute Gilson, but to put things in perhaps
a different perspective.

1. I'm quite sure "this isn't meant to refute Gilson": in fact, this supports Gilson up and down the line, although in a drier encyclopedia type style and not in as much detail. It also supports the points I've been making about Descartes connection through Augustine to Plato. He doesn't address, unfortunately but maybe only because of space considerations, the Augustinian tradition between Augustine and Descartes and the Suarezian influence, nor does he tie Plato in with "archaic ontology." That's OK, I don't expect that of academic philosophers, but if you point Eliade's work out to him he might be interested.

2. I don't find Cottingham's perspective all that different, aside from obvious differences of style and the fact (at least I suspect this is fact) that he hasn't the depth of knowledge in the medieval background that Gilson does. That's OK, too, and no slam; those who have that depth of background can probably be counted on one hand. The fact is, Cottingham like others is almost certainly using Gilson's work on Descartes' background. Obviously a smart guy.

In this central part of his philosophy, Descartes follows in a long tradition going back to Augsitine (with its ultimate roots in Plato) that in the first place is sketpical about the evidence of the senses as against the more reliable abstract perceptions of the intellect, and in the second place sees such intellectual knowledge as a kind of illumiknation derived from a higher source than man's own mind.

Cottingham rightly notes the skepticism that seems to be part and parcel of the platonic tradition, and which I, too, stressed. He also points out what I referred to as the deus ex machina style solutions that are offered.

What is ture, nonetheless, is that the fundamental building blocks of Cartesian science are the innate ideas (chiefly those of mathematics) whose reliabilty Descartes takes as guaranteed by thier having been implanted in the mind by God. ...

I seem to recall taking a substantial amount of abuse for pointing out what seems to be common knowledge: that Descartes' system is fundamentally based on his mathematics.

The scientifc system that Descartes had worked on before he wrote the Meditations and that he elaborated in his later work, the Principles of Philosophy, attempts wherever possible to reduce natural phenomena to the quantitative descriptions of arithmetic and geometry

Dittoes. I said it, repeating Gilson, who provided ample documentation.

His attempt to construct a system of knowledge by starting from the subjective awareness of the conscious self has been equally important, if only because so much of the epistemology of our own time has been a reaction against the autocentric perspective from which Descartes starts out.

This is good. But Gilson wrote the book that explained:

1. Why philosophers keep wrestling with this problem on Cartesian and Kantian terms, and are always unsuccessful; and

2. Why the only real solution is that of St. Thomas:
Thomist realism and the critique of knowledge, a truly GREAT book--do yourself a favor and check it out, preferably after The Unity of Philosophical Experience.

[jim stone]

John says that Descartes went to La Feche in Anjou at
the age of ten, stayed nine years, 'studied classical literature
and traditional classics-based subjects such as
history and rhetoirc as well as natural philosophy
(based on the Aristotelian system) and theology.
Descartes later wrote of La Fleche that he considered it 'one of the
best schools in europe,' but that, as regards the philosophy
he had learned there, he saw that 'despite being cultivated
for many centuries by the best minds, it contained no point
which was not disputed and hence doubtful.'

Of course this is the Encylopedia article and doesn't
go into detail about Suarez's influence. Descartes's comment about
the history of philosophy is certainly apt.

It seems to me that we have the trees arranged not
too badly--but what I don't yet understand is your
negative view of the forest. My impression is that you
think badly of Descartes, that he is arrogantly applying
a mathematical method where it doesn't belong,
dismissing history, and doing a disservice to
science and philosophy.

John writes that 'Descartes's vision of a unified understanding of
reality has retained a powerful hold on scientists and philosophers
ever since. His insistence that the path to progress in science
lay in the direction of quantitative explanations has been substantially
vindicated.' This is part of the difference in perspective
I had in mind (between you, if I understand you, and John)
for this would be an extraordinary achievement.
John adds: 'Descartes's insistence that the phenomena of conscious experience are recalcitrant to explanation in
purely physical terms remains deeply influential...'
This is another contribution--the most energetic part
of philosophy today is dealing with precisely the
issues that descartes raised here, and daily acknowledges
its debt to him.

We know that Descartes lived in a time when the Aristotelian
paradigm of science was being rejected (Aristotelianism
is of course very powerful in Thomism), when the
very idea of what science is was undergoing a
sea change. Under such
circumstances one can understand looking for a
new methodology. One can hardly fault him
for failing to be a Thomist. It's hard for me to see this
as arrogance; it rather looks like the work of
a creative mind. Descartes's proposal to mathematize
science, to view the natural world mechanistically,
including biology and animal behaviour, seems
extraordinary. The material world is
simply an indefinite series of variation in the physical
features of matter. The path to progress in scinece
lies in the direction of quantitative explanation.

John writes:

In a celebrated simile, Descartes described the whole of philosophy
as like a tree: the roots are metaphysics, the trunk physics,
and the branches are the various particular sciences,
including mechanics, medicicne, and morals. ...
This insistence on the essential unity of knowledge,
contrasts strongly with the Aristotelian
conception of the sciences as series of of separate
disciplines. The sciences, as Descartes put it, are all
'linked together' in a sequence that is in principle as simple
and straightforward as the series of numbers.

As John says, this Cartesian idea of 'the unity of science' has had
a profound influence, and it affects the way science
is done. At the end of the day, biology, chemistry,
and so on reduce to physics. It may or may not be true, but it is very important.

Few people think Descartes got everything right.
The desire for mathematical certainty as the only model
of knowledge leads to awful problems. But this is recurrent
in Rationalist philosophers, especially when science
is shifting. No philosopher this interesting isn't going
to go seriously wrong on important things. The idea
that we are immaterial souls leads to terrible
problems for a scientific psychology, not to mention
how the soul controls the body. And so on.
But these mistakes, if so they are, are immensely
interesting. For what is knowlege and what is
the relation of mind to body if Descartes
got it wrong?

It's hard for me not to see in Descartes
a great philosopher, and one of the great
creative minds in history. Best

[elendil]

Descartes later wrote of ... the philosophy
he had learned [at La Fleche], ... that 'despite being cultivated
for many centuries by the best minds, it contained no point
which was not disputed and hence doubtful.'

Of course this is the Encylopedia article and doesn't
go into detail about Suarez's influence. Descartes's comment about
the history of philosophy is certainly apt.

1. Do you really find that an apt comment? Do you really think that his philosophical studies at La Fleche did full justice to the history of philosophy? Do you not find it just a bit puerile?
2. I don't know your friend John, but I see no reason why an encyclopedia article should fail to mention the heavily Suarezian background of Descartes' studies. Suarez has been extremely influential (including on Kant) and his influence on Descartes is absolutely key to understanding Descartes' thought. Gilson's work on Descartes was original and groundbreaking and overcame centuries of scholarly taboos.
3. Descartes also got an excellent mathematical education at La Fleche.

My impression is that you
think badly of Descartes, that he is arrogantly applying
a mathematical method where it doesn't belong,
dismissing history, and doing a disservice to
science and philosophy.

One dimensional, is how I might describe Descartes.

John writes that 'Descartes's vision of a unified understanding of
reality has retained a powerful hold on scientists and philosophers
ever since. His insistence that the path to progress in science
lay in the direction of quantitative explanations has been substantially
vindicated.'

I have no particular quarrel with that, but neither do I think that modern quantitative methods in science would have been stillborn if Descartes had never existed. Few people, I suspect, would ever credit Descartes as the Father of Modern Science. I think Gilson does full justice to Descartes' true genius, but places his influence on science in a truer perspective. Gilson's criticism of Descartes' program was that Descartes applied it (or tried to apply it) precisely to all of reality, including philosophy.

John adds: 'Descartes's insistence that the phenomena of conscious experience are recalsitrant to explanation in
purely physical terms remains deeply influential...'
This is another contribution--the most energetic part
of philosophy today is dealing with precisely the
issues that descartes raised here, and daily acknowledges
its debt to him.

Check out Summa Theologiae I, q. 75 - 89 on Man. Aquinas' philosophical anthropology goes far beyond anything Descartes even dreamed of. It remains able to do full justice to modern psychology (my father's specialties as a professor of psychology for at least 20 years, in addition to clinical psychology, included history and methods, and he was/is quite conversant with Descartes' contributions vis a vis those of Thomas). I'm willing to give Descartes his due, but it seems so paltry in comparison. I view Thomas' principled insistence on the physical/psychical unity of man as heroic in the face of the dualisms that were current in his day, and which Descartes merely aped.

In addition, the solution that Descartes proposed has had the Western world chasing its epistemological tail for centuries, in one form or another. The resultant recurring philosophical messes have a significant amount to due with the problems of the modern age. That's being "deeply influential," it's true, but... His contributions to mathematics were real and lasting; I don't believe his contributions to science, per se, were; I just don't see much point in wasting time on Cartesian philosophy when there's an outstanding alternative available.

We know that Descartes lived in a time when the Aristotelian
paradigm of science was being rejected (Aristotelianism
is of course very powerful in Thomism), when the
very idea of what science is was undergoing a
sea change. Under such
circumstances one can understand looking for a
new methodology. One can hardly fault him
for failing to be a Thomist.

It's a measure of Thomas' true genius that he realized that Aristotle's and other ancients' attempts at science were time conditioned. In discussing the Ptolmaic system Thomas explicitly noted that it was theoretical and could no doubt be explained differently. His definition of time as, essentially, a function of motion ( = change, in his terminology) is basically the same as that of Einstein. The fact is, the philosophical essentials of Thomas' thought differ in fundamental respects from those of Aristotle, largely due to Thomas' distinction between esse and essentia. As a result, Thomism is in no way tied to the scientific conclusions of the ancients. It's true that Thomas maintains that each science has its proper method. That's not much of an obstacle, is easily subject to revision without affecting fundamental philosophical principles, and has a lot to do with how you classify the sciences. If Descartes had been willing to take the time to seriously study someone like Aquinas--rather than assuming that the philosophy that he got at La Fleche was the be all and end all--I'd be somewhat more understanding. It's true, of course, that in that respect he was very much a child of his age (as Gilson makes clear), but others like Banez got it mostly right. They were ignored.

As John says, this Cartesioan idea of 'the unity of science' has had
a profound influence, and it affects the way science
is done. At the end of the day, biology, chemistry,
and so on reduce to physics. It may or may not be true, but it is very important.

I'm quite sure there are more than a few scientists, not to say philosophers, who have some problems with Cartesian reductionism and what they might see as its sometimes malign influence. I wouldn't be surprised (but have no idea) to discover that your friend Swinburn (sp.?) might be one of them.

For what is knowlege and what is
the relation of mind to body if Descartes
got it wrong?

Well, as I noted above, Aquinas thought he had some answers. You might be surprised to learn that many neuro-physiologists (John Eccles, for example, a Nobel laureate, for what it's worth) actually reach very similar conclusions to those of Aquinas. Unfortunately, they learned as part of their education that the Middle Ages were the Dark Ages, so they never bothered reading Aquinas. Another sad result of their inadequate philosophical education is that they think there's no alternative between materialism and a strict dualism. However, if you read what they're actually saying any Thomist would recognize that they're not really proposing a Cartesian style dualism but rather a unity of man a la Aquinas.

But, I repeat--none of this has that much to do with my real interests.

[jim stone]

Three points, quickly.

I think everything non-trivial in the history of philosophy is
doubtful.

Yes, Swinburne, who is a substance dualist,
must reject the unity of the sciences; as
Descartes should have, for the same reason.
Difficulties concerning the reduction of mental
states to physical states threaten the unity
of the sciences, and the principal effort in
the last thirty years of phil pscyh and
philosophy of mind has been to explain
how psychology could possibly reduce to
physics. This effort has failed, I believe.

Aquinas's views concerning the unity of
body and soul are extremely interesting,
I think. The idea that there is another path
between materialism and substance dualism
is important; the contemporary position
closest to Aquinas's is called functionalism
or non-reductive materialism. I'm not sure
whether Aquinas's position, as he actually
held it, will escape the problems
that afflict substance dualism, though it
certainly isn't substance dualism (these
difficulties flow from what he says about
will, intellect, and the rational soul).

Thanks for the conversation. I see that you
get better the harder I press on you. Best, Jim

[Jerry Freeman]

If you'll forgive me for jumping into a conversation about literature with which I'm not very familiar ...

I've mentioned this before, but I'm of the opinion that physics potentially can explain consciousness in a way that would be consistent with at least some of the philosophical ideas you're discussing.

I think the problem is, there's a natural inclination to assume that there are different consciousnesses, which are somehow separated from one another by each of our individual skins. It's natural to assume that, because that's how the world looks to most people.

However, it's not the way it looks to everyone (and this is very relevant to this discussion of ego vs. altruism and the motivations involved). To some people, it looks as though the individual entities are illusory, or at least they are phenomenal artifacts emerging from an underlying, ultimately undivided base.

Physics is close to having a description of that underlying base, and it isn't difficult at all for someone to whom the world looks like the second description, to say, "Right. And if you take a careful look at the descriptions physics provides of that underlying base, it's very easy to think that this could be consciousness, if only you are willing to look at it that way."

I think most people dismiss this possibility out of hand because the world looks to them as though consciousness is only something encapsulated within separate individualities. But, as I said, that's not how the world looks to everyone.

Best wishes,
Jerry

[elendil]

Physics is close to having a description of that underlying base

i'm not so sure about that, jerry. it seems to me (and i'm no scientist) that as fast as physics advances the goal recedes. perhaps that has to do with the limits of method and cartesian reductionism. there definitely seems to be a problem--and this may be part of what you're referring to--coming to grips with exactly what matter is. i have a book by a mathematician/physicist/thomist named wolfgang smith, the quantum enigma, that dealt with some of those issues, but i'll be gol-durned ( ) if i can remember much of anything from that book, although it impressed me greatly at the time. i'll have to look at it again. thanks for reminding me.

jim, part of the problem is having different heros: the lack makes shorthand discussion difficult, and therefore somewhat tedious--at least by means of messageboard.

[Jerry Freeman]

Physics is close to having a description of that underlying base

i'm not so sure about that, jerry. it seems to me (and i'm no scientist) that as fast as physics advances the goal recedes. perhaps that has to do with the limits of method and cartesian reductionism. there definitely seems to be a problem--and this may be part of what you're referring to--coming to grips with exactly what matter is.

If you look at how existence behaves at the Planck scale, it looks remarkably like descriptions of that which is "Greater than the greatest and smaller than the smallest" ("anoraniyam mahatomahiyan"), and when you examine the phenomenon of spontaneous dynamical symmetry breaking that occurs at the beginning of a big bang and is simultaneously occurring perpetually at every point in creation, it looks (at least from the point of view I mentioned) remarkably like some sort of universal underlying consciousness.

As I said, it's very easy to dismiss such ideas because they don't fit the dualistic world most of us subjectively inhabit.

Best wishes,
Jerry

[jim stone]

I don't mind your having a different hero.
Aquinas is a fine hero. My hero is Hume.
I didn't find our discussion tedious. Best

[Jerry Freeman]

As a semi-lurker to this thread, let me say thanks to the various participants for taking time to go into such a detailed and thoughtful discussion. As always, this is a great place to access all kinds of ideas, and I very much appreciate the quality of content that gets contributed.

Best wishes,
Jerry

P.S. Carry on!

[glauber]

My hero is Batman.