Matter of opinion.

[Jerry Freeman]

Hi, Jim.

I would agree with you that it's more useful in the world we inhabit, to speak of the piece of bronze as surviving the changes you've described, since that's our common experience of it.

Perhaps what Burke is getting at is that the piece of bronze is different things to different observers. (If not, I'll forget about Burke here and present that idea myself.)

The piece of bronze ceases to be a piece of bronze and becomes a sculpture in the universe of the person who desired it to become a sculpture and changed its form with that intent. It might remain a piece of bronze in someone else's (it obviously would in Jim Stone's) universe.

You could also consider that altering the bronze with the desire to transform it into a sculpture makes it a sculpture and a piece of bronze at the same time, at least in some universes.

It would depend on whether the sculptor or other observer were still able to see the piece of bronze. Here, you get an outcome where the piece of bronze can change fluidly back and forth from a sculpture to a piece of bronze depending on the state of consciousness of the observer and who is observing. (And I have no problem with that.)

In other universes, it might be a landmark and a piece of bronze, an anchor and a piece of bronze, etc.

In the Planck scale of quantum physics, it's neither a sculpture nor a piece of bronze. This world is consistent with the worlds inhabited by enlightened souls who say it's their direct experience that none of "this" is real and that it's all nothing but illusion or conditioning or karma or pure existance or consciousness or knowledge or emptiness or whatever.

It's all a matter of point of view and who's making the rules. You can "prove" that something is what you decide it is according to your own state of consciousness and conditions, but not for all states of consciousness and conditions. (I'm still working on an elaboration of what I've written to you about different states of consciousness, by the way.)

Best wishes,
Jerry

P.S. And of course, if you debate with me, I will say that you are absolutely right. I will say that each of numerous, contradictory points of view is correct and true, even though according to common sense logic, only one could be true. It's my point of view that paradoxical, contradictory, "mutually exclusive" realities exist and superimpose themselves over the same terrain simultaneously, and that this is the norm, rather than the exception to the norm.

[Nanohedron]

Jim, one could say that artistic intent transforms the bronze; in that case it could be argued that the bronze is not the same bronze it was, but destroyed for new? That's a tough one for me. At a certain level I find this persuasive, and the idea that matter is annihilated and recreated from moment to infinitesimally small moment poses no problems for me, but my mossy Aristotelian side sees the destruction of a substance because it has been re-formed with intent as metaphoric. On the other hand, I ask myself, if a piece of bronze merely appears continuous in time why couldn't intent be a part of the dynamics of impermanence? And what's up with all these inane questions I keep pestering people with?

I think I'll go and consult a beer. Yes, that sounds best.

[jim stone]

Wow, you'all are great. The statue is
kind of a strange thing, because whether
or not it's a statue depends on people's
intentions. Let's raise the problem without
the statue and the bronze.

This is a version of the problem
that comes from Chrysippus, an ancient Stoic
philosopher.

Suppose 'Jim' names this man, this human animal.
'B' names my brain. If you amputate Jim's foot,
the animal survives; a man can survive the loss of
a foot. Also an arm, an ear, and so on.

The limiting case of amputation is the brain.
That is if we pare Jim down to his brain,
and keep that alive in a vat (I don't care,
as long as I can stay online), Jim, the animal
survives, although in a horribly mutilated state.
The animal survives if his central nervous system
does. (If you don't like that, use my head.)
B is all that's left of Jim.

So Jim, that man, survives being pared down to his brain.

Of course my brain also survives.
Nothing has been taken from it.
So Jim and B are in the same place after
this amputation.

But Jim is distinct from B.
Yesterday Jim included feet as parts; B didn't,
Yesterday Jim weighed over a hundred pounds;
B didn't.

So we have two physical objects coincident in
space and time.

Here is Chrysippus' arguement very simply.

1. Jim and B both survive the amputation, B is all that's
left of Jim.

2. But Jim and B remain distinct--even today they have different
historical properties. Yesterday Jim weighed more
than B.

Therefore,

3. After the amputation
we have two physical things in
the same space and time.

I continue to see this as weird.
These things are made of the same
molecules arranged in the same way.
In virtue of what are there two and not
one? In virtue of what have they different
historical properties?

This is called 'Chrysippus's Puzzle,'
because we have a forceful
argument for a crazy conclusion. Best

[jim stone]

Just remembered this more recent version
of the puzzle.

'Tibbles' names a normal cat.
"Puss' names the proper part of Tibbles that
is made up of all of him except his tail.

Last night, tragically, Tibbles's tail was amputated.

Tibbles survives--a cat can survive the loss of
a tail.

So does Puss--nothing was chopped off Puss.

Puss is all that's left of Tibbles.

So today, Puss and Tibbles are in the same
place.

However Tibbles has a property Puss lacks.
Tibbles has the property of having included a tail
as a part, of having been two and a half feet long, etc.

So Tibbles and Puss are distinct.

So we are left with distinct material
things in the same place and time.

Hopefully Jessie K. won't read this! Best

[Nanohedron]

Jim and B are distinct but inseparable. Jim is a dynamic condition, not a physical object only; B a ground without which Jimness cannot be. If B is all that's left physically of what was once a roughly complete human form, Jim exists (if such it can be called) because living human consciousness and self-awareness depend on there being a functioning brain. This raises the question of a complete human form in a state of irreversible brain trauma: if Nano were stretched out in a coma, and all other functions operational (let's not discuss my weekends, please ), does Nano exist? Unfortunately I have no better solution to offer than that it depends on your point of reference. I see no hard and fast absolutes in this, but I'm not trained in logic.

[Nanohedron]

However Tibbles has a property Puss lacks.
Tibbles has the property of having included a tail
as a part, of having been two and a half feet long, etc.

So Tibbles and Puss are distinct.

So we are left with distinct material
things in the same place and time.

Again, Tibbles and Puss are ways of referring to a material thing. If Tibbles must have a tail to be Tibbles -and you have said that Tibbles survives as Tibbles sans tail- it follows that Tibbles and Puss are solely categories (no pun intended). Are they not ultimately the same cat? Only the concepts occupy the same space, it seems to me.

[jim stone]

Tibbles is a cat, not a category, or a concept or
way of referring to things. Tibbles meows and
eats tunafish. Categories and concepts
don't do that.
Puss is Tibble's torso.

'Tibbles' is a word. 'Tibbles' isn't Tibbles.
The concept of Tibbles isn't Tibbles.

The problem is that Tibbles, like any other
cat, can survive the loss of a tail.
So after the amputation, Tibbles, sans
tail, is where Puss is, because Puss is
all that's left of him. So I don't think
concepts are playing any obvious
role here--though maybe you're right,
ultimately.

[Nanohedron]

I think part of my difficulty here is my ineptitude at math and, by extension, logic. I do make a distinction between the dynamic reality of my cat in her day-to-day life, and her name, which I see as an identity, a label which implies who and what she is. I'm not saying I'm right, just pointing out that to me, Mubu specifies a particular cat, but is not in fact the cat herself. I fear I may have drifted off course, though.

Jim, this has been most instructive, and I thank you for you patient good will in indulging my ramblings.

OK, now for that beer. See y'all!

[Jerry Freeman]

Hi, Jim.

There's an assumption inherent in your statements. To my eye, they make the whole argument circular.

You assume that Jim cannot survive the demise of Jim's brain. I believe that is an artificial, though deeply seated assumption. It seems to be common sense, intuitively "the way it must be."

The assumption is, as far as I can tell, based on two things, neither of which can be considered reliable sources of truth. They are just assumptions, and as such, subject to question.

1. The tendency to give matter priority over consciousness in our intellectual constructions. That is to say, we tend to think consciousness is an epiphenomenon that emerges from matter (the body and brain), once it is built up enough, complex enough to exhibit consciousness.

There is another point of view, not inconsistent with current theories of quantum physics, that consciousness is primary and matter is the epiphenomenon. That point of view has it that matter emerges when consciousness has elaborated enough complexity within itself to create the framework for matter to exist. Then you get the world(s) of matter and the whole menagerie of beings inhabiting various bodies, seemingly separate souls with separate consciousnesses.

I know this grates against your way of looking at it, but that point of view is there, and I find it plausible, based on my own experiences and what I've been able to glean from various sources, both ancient and modern.

On the other hand, even if I concede there's no universal field that might be identical with consciousness at the basis of everything, and really, it's just all empty space, an empty backdrop against which all relative phenomena play, there's still nothing to refute the possibility that Jim doesn't automatically cease to exist with the demise of Jim's brain. There still might be subtler versions of Jim that don't need a physical brain to exist.

Today, radio seems perfectly normal because we understand it. But two centuries ago, it would have seemed unthinkable. Just because we don't presently understand how something might work doesn't mean it can't be.

2. We're wired to think that we cease to exist when our bodies cease to exist because if we didn't think that way, we would have no aversion to dying. That would be a disaster for the species. Since we do inherit many of our traits, the trait of having an aversion to dying would be one of the most likely to survive and pass down through generations.

I heard it said by one of my mentors thus: He just tossed it out in the midst of a long discourse about I don't remember what. "And ahankara (the small ego, sense of I and mine) is there to protect the body ... ." We necessarily invest so much in our aversion to dying, in staying alive, but when we actually die, I think it's quite possible that on the other side, we'll think, "Hmmm. That wasn't such a big deal. I wonder what all the fuss was about."

Best wishes,
Jerry

[Jack]

I've loved this post.

Can anybody reccommend a book that deals with some of this, for a person who wants to understand but isn't quite sure if s/he does and for whom internet reading doesn't always sink in the way it's supposed to?

I'm sorry if I've taken up space I probably shouldn't have but I really want to know more. You can PM me if you want.

[jim stone]

I don't think I assume that Jim, the animal, cannot survive
the demise of Jim's brain. Only that as long as Jim's
brain is alive and cooking, Jim, the animal survives.
A functioning brain is sufficient for the animal's survival,
is what I need; I haven't said it's necessary.

Also, there's the (less controversial) case
of Tibbles, which has nothing to do with consciousness.

I stink at math but I'm better at logic. Numbers are
prickly for me.

Here's the convention. When we want to refer to
a name we put it in quotes. 'Tibbles' refers to
a word. Take off the quote marks, and you
refer to the cat. 'Jerry Freeman' refers to Jerry
Freeman's name. 'Jerry Freeman' is a phrase.
But Jerry Freeman is a man, not a phrase.

Mubu is a cat, not a name or a word. 'Mubu' is
a word.

Thanks to all for all the helpful conversation. I sometimes
include things I write here in my papers. Jim

[herbivore12]

Maybe I'm missing something in the Tibbles example, but . . .

If "Tibbles" names a normal cat (and Tibbles is the cat with tail), and "Puss" is that part of Tibbles other than the tail, and if said tail is amputated, does Tibbles (as opposed to "Tibbles") really survive? That is, we'd still refer to the Puss part as "Tibbles", sure, but is Tibbles -- the cat with tail -- still in existance?

Am I missing something? Or was that just a problem in giving the short version of the story?

And if B (Jim's brain) is kept alive, outside of Jim (his body), is it really true that Jim has survived? That is, does our consciousness alone define Jim-ness, or is Jim's consciousness, without access to the world in the way it had access before, really still everything we'd call "Jim"?

(And then, going forward, would it be more or less Jim if we put the brain in a robot body so it could interact with the world, etc? And if we chose to plug our brains into a machine that made us believe we were interacting with the world and were happy people, even though we were really just brains in vats, not interacting with the physical world, would we still be Jim, or Nano, or Jerry or Aaron or Wombat or Cranberry, if we did so? Oy.)

I know the comfortable thing -- and maybe even the right thing -- is to assume that our essential selves, our Jim-ness, survives any amount of amputation or paralysis or other loss. But I wonder if a brain in a vat -- even a fully aware, alive brain -- is still (for example) Jim. I dunno the answer to that one. Or maybe I do, but don't know I know.

[Lorenzo]

Good points, Aaron. (how do you know you know?)

And to everyone I'd say...

"Hoo, hoo...who are you?"

I could say, "use your brain" but, the escapist would use that as a springboard to manufacture two out of one because of the swaddling implication that "you" is some kind of entity apart from your brain. I could say "wow, you're a real brain" but, such an open-ended term might be too much of a temptation for the literalist who might miss the point that "you" are an ass, or you are a limb, or you are tail, or a voice that has no vocal chords-as the spiritual non-mechanist might claim. I could say you have a tail, or have a voice, have a brain, or you don't have a leg to stand on, but the escapist might also use that to try and prove that the term "you" can mean whatever you want it to mean.

We are bound by commonly accepted definitions and semantics of our time, but with freedom to expand (or exagerate) by stating what we mean-leaving no one to guess or misinterpret what we mean. That's for the escapist who would like to have it both ways, or either way, if only for security...realizing that reality is too difficult to handle or understand.

There is a world, and there may be other worlds, and we may be "worlds apart" but, this should not provide opportunity for someone to imagine that our language, as commonly used, is not good enough to transport our ideas to one another. Does the word "all" need an ess at the end? Alls? That sounds too closely akin to alzheimer's . No, There's no need for the opportunist to create two out of one, if only just for fun...even playgrounds have rules.

There's no difference between "the bronze" and "the statue" when the terms are used interchangably. But watch out for the tricksters. Sure, the statue is gone, and the bronze (defined as any shape of the slab) still exists. But only when we (or you) know what you (or we) mean...can we grasp either the complexity, or the shallowness, of the problem. Say what you mean.

When the pathologist examines the non-croaker, he may say to the coroner, "let's put J's jaws together." Well! That's technically not J, or is it? But we use language to transport ideas to one another, yet sometimes with a double standard. Sometimes we just communicate and understand. Other times we use legal definitions, causing confusion.

I recently wrote a letter to the editor of our newspaper, referring to our "surface ground water" problems resulting from a neighboring city dumping the worlds largest rerouted artesian well run-off (from under a mall) into our city limits. An attorney, also an elected official, responded spending two paragraphs talking about "surface flooding above ground" when in reality, the term "surface ground water" technically means any water down to 50' below the surface. One of the farmers can't even plow the ground because it's so saturated, and the builders will never be able to dig a basement. This critical zone will have to be backfilled, and the developers should have mitigated that according the EIS.

So, I could say "ground water" and we could go on and on about flooding, or I could say "bronze" or "statue," or "Puss" and "Tibbles," and go on and on, having apparently manufactured two out of one (to the unsuspecting), until the language guardian comes along and cures the misunderstanding by providing a valid definition.

This is exactly what the legal authorities and specialist have done with our federal, state, and local codes. They have sorted out all the definitions first, before prceding with the expectation, so that no one-even a wayfaring person, though a fool-need error therin. Think of how many other misunderstandings, or conundrums, could be resolved if we either stuck to commonly accepted usage of language (for our times and location-aside from the idiograms and idioms of foriegn language barriors... "you big vegetable!")

But, I approve of what we are doing, it's both entertaining and educational, and the exercise of solving puzzles can help prevent alzheimer's.

What are we-living dust? Then, what is the world-dead blood? Why is the sky blue? Why is the sky red? What if the blue sky meets the red sky...should the rules change, or are we just going round and round? If you take the anger out of a broken heart, will you feel no pain? If you try to fail, and you succeed, what have you done?

Who are you?

[McHaffie]

This is always a fun topic at the Ren fairs! I actually had a seemingly nice lady, wonderful recorder player... truly ... very good player ... come up to me and compliment me on my whistles, and that it was too bad that we couldn't try a duet of sorts. When I offered to do so, she insisted it wouldn't be possible since a whistle " isn't a real wind instrument, and is not a chromatic scale. It just wouldn't work "

Naturally, I was not at all shocked and was more than eager to prove her quite wrong in her snootiness.

By the end of it, she was flushed red as a beet while I played a full scale and right along several Ren tunes she was playing that I had long since learned, and I was humble and polite about it, while on the inside I was beaming with self pride and gloating just a bit.

So, I say it's a Supersixholedinstrumentthatcanbeeitheror

[jim stone]

OK, here's Chrysippus's original example.

Dion is a man. Theon is the part of Dion that is
all of Dion but his left foot.

This morning Dion's left foot was successfully
amputated.

A man can survive the amputation of his foot,
so Dion survives.

Theon also survives, for nothing has been
taken from Theon. Theon is all that's left
of Dion.

So after the amputation Dion and Theon are
in the same place.

Still they have some different properties:
Dion alone has the property that yesterday
he included a left foot as a part.

Therefore they are distinct.

Therefore there are two physical things
in the same place at the same time,
(which Chrysippus thinks is Koo Koo,
which is why this is called Chrysippus's Puzzle.)
This is an argument, with premisses,
inferences, and a conclusion.

So the way to attack it is to deny a premiss,
maintian that there is an invalid inference,
or insist that it's circular.

Maybe the claim that a man can survive
the amputation of a left foot is mistaken,
Herbi, but it certainly seems plausible.

By a man I just mean a human animal.
Dion is a man, and men can survive
such amputations. That's all Chrysippus
needs.
I'm convinced that this problem isn't about
words--it's about the nature of reality.
Something that we believe about the world
has got to be changed.

We arrived unconsciously at a theory about material
things long before science started.
It's so deeply embedded in our thought
that we're not aware of it.
You might call it 'folk physics'
What the ancient greek paradoxes and
puzzles show, I think, is that that theory
is mistaken. But how? Where?
And what's the truth?

I think philosophy is part of science,
you see--it's investigating the material
world (not just that, of course).
Chrysippus is raising questions so deep and fundamental
that they are hard to take seriously,
and may seem to be about words,
but they're about what the world
is like, how long things last, the
kind of changes they can and cannot
survive.

Russell once said that philsophy is
science before we have a good reason to
believe it.

We do math all the time, but what
are numbers? Where are they? What
are they made of? What, if anything,
are we talking about when we do
math? Questions like these are about
reality, I think, not merely about
words. Best to all, Jim