One Minute Time Machine

[MTGuru]

I really need one of these!

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vBkBS4O3yvY

(You might recognize the actor Brian Dietzen as Ducky's assistant Jimmy Palmer from NCIS.)

[megapop]

Haha that was really cool!

But it may be disputable whether they really died or not. Apparently, each time he (or she) presses the button his body dies, while in a parallel universe his consciousness continues in a new body. For if it wasn't the same consciousness, he wouldn't know about the minute which just passed in the original universe; so his conscious self never died but just "hopped" into (or got reinstantiated in) another universe.

Now one could argue that the original consciousness (or actually just a copy of it) got "injected" into a new body, and so it isn't the same person any more. But since the original self ceased to exist, the new consciousness is indistinguishable from the original -- it's in fact identical. Of course there's a "cut", there's no material connection between the two bodies. But since consciousness isn't exactly material itself, how would you know that such a connection is necessary for continuous personal identity? One material body died, the identical consciousness continues in another universe... so what?

It's the same as the transporter argument from star trek. One body gets destroyed, and instantly an exact copy is reproduced somewhere else. Intuitively, you'd say that the original died and the transported person just thinks that she's the same because she shares the original's memories. But consciousness isn't matter. It could just as well continue to exist somewhere else. (Depends on your mind-body conception I suppose.)

Coincidentally I've been thinking about this problem just today.

[Nanohedron]

Oh, my poor head.

[benhall.1]

I like that. Romantic.



... oh and by that way, I've said this before but I'll say it again: you guys really should read E.R. Eddison.

[ytliek]

It is called a time out. Outta here. You all are already "on the clock" live it!

[Nanohedron]

It is called a time out. Outta here. You all are already "on the clock" live it!

[emmline]

Whose premise is it that consciousness can't also split? I submit that it replicates, mitosis-like, with all copies remaining viable.

[an seanduine]

Bob Heinlein had a lot of fun with these sorts of paradoxes with his short story All you zombies. . .. The protagonist, through the mechanism of time travel and trans-gendering was at once his/her own mother/father.

Bob

[megapop]

Whose premise is it that consciousness can't also split? I submit that it replicates, mitosis-like, with all copies remaining viable.

This is indeed an interesting proposal with interesting consequences. Suppose it would be possible to upload a consciousness to a computer. As the uploaded consciousness is functionally the same as the original consciousness, and since this suggests that it points to the same experience of continuity in qualia space, it would be as identical to the original as the original is itself just one moment after the uploading procedure. You then have two equally identical consciousnesses, neither of which can be considered to be the "real" you. From that point however the consciousnesses start to diverge, of course. So the only way to preserve the greatest possible personal identity of the uploaded mind would be to actually destroy the original brain during the uploading process. (c.f. Michael Cerullo 2015, p. 33)

[emmline]

Yeah, but...why do that? I think I have a very live and let live attitude here.

[megapop]

When your body is going to die you could continue your existence in your smart phone or something. And instead of an urn you just get the DVD.

[Nanohedron]

Snuff out a candle flame - existence and nonexistence are simple enough to differentiate. But re-light it - now is it the same flame? Or light another candle with a lit candle - is the resulting new flame the same flame? We humans are complex creatures saddled with the burden of our particular expression of self-awareness, and it typically leads us to the conventional conclusion that being and consciousness are strictly individual, and that is that. Well, maybe they are; I sometimes have my doubts, but I'm nowhere near a firm conclusion. More to the point, we become attached to our identities, dreading the prospect of being erased.

Despite the things I'd dearly love to change about the aspects that make me an individual, attachment to my conscious "self" is normal, but not at all rational. Were I to be molecularly transported à la Star Trek, I could only conclude that since the end result appeared for all intents and purposes to be the same living "me" with the same memories etc., it would be functionally "me", but ... actually not. My "self", while real enough, has at the same time proved illusory. Now what?

But it's also true that I need another cup of coffee, so make of that what you will.

[I.D.10-t]

existence and nonexistence are simple enough to differentiate.

What about ideas? Does Frankenstein's creation not exist due to being fiction?

Are we like a cell that is formed, live, and replaced? Are we a part of a mind that covers the earth and each one of us learns and grows contributes? Or are we thoughtless beasts? I hope as humans we think. You can snuff out knowledge, it will come back. You can light another candle with it, and the fire will spread. Your body has been replaced since you were born. Are you still you? Cells have divided died and changed, it is the backlog of data that makes you.

In my mind, sentient life is not about molecules and body parts. We can ascend by being the shoulder that others can stand on.

[walrii]

These discussions make the unspoken assumption that the human mind and body are two different things like hardware and software. Lines of code and data exist independent of the machine that runs and processes them. I'm am not convinced that the mind exists independent of the body. If we swapped out cells (hardware) no matter how exactly we attempted to replicate them, we could well end up with different a different mind (software) simply because the cells were almost identical but different.

This line of reasoning is unacceptable to virtually all of us because, atheist or fundamentalist, we all have an innate sense that we are immortal, that some part of us survives the death of our physical body. Yet we may well have this innate sense simply because, for our species to survive, we must. A self-aware species that sees death as a final end may well be mentally incapable of surviving. From what I've read of the development of the human species, evidence of self-awareness (pictures of ourselves most commonly) occurs with evidence of a belief in immortality (burial of the dead most commonly). Perhaps these two traits are linked because without such a link our species would have perished.

[Nanohedron]

These discussions make the unspoken assumption that the human mind and body are two different things like hardware and software.

True, but the discussion aside, I'm not aware of any other way to speak of them. In the final analysis I don't think one can seriously consider body and consciousness as independent of each other, but for language to be fruitful (as well as a minefield) it is necessary to be able to speak of them so. It's the same as my fingernails: to speak of them, I don't have to take their inseparability from the body into account. Well, unless I'm being tortured with pliers, of course, but that's a different matter.

But it's true that we tend to think of body and consciousness as separate and therefore potentially separable things. For some reason we place our sense of self in the domain of the mind. I'm unconvinced that things are that simple, but...what if? That's the thing. You can't help but ask all the same.